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I. INTRODUCTION
Sex. I Violence.2 Explicit language.' Drug abuse.' Scandal.' Greed.
1. In keeping with the tradition of modem American entertainment, televised trials typically
involve allegations of sexual and sex-related misconduct rather than normal sexual relationships.
See Massimo Calabresi, Swaying the Home Jury, Time, Jan. 10, 1994, at 56, 56 (statement of
Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz) ("Virtually all [Court TV covers] is sex, gore and
pornography."). These televised trials often involve rather graphic details of this activity. See
infra note 3.
Perhaps the first widely watched "gavel-to-gavel" trial was the December 1991
acquaintance rape trial of William Kennedy Smith. See infra note 84 and accompanying text;
PAUL THALER, THE WATCHFUL EYE: AMERIcAN JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF THE TELEVISION TRIAL
38 (1994) (describing the Smith trial as 'a made-for-television event"); David A. Harris, The
Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional Television, and Public Understanding of the
Criminal Justice System, 35 ARIz. L. REV. 785, 801 n. 132 (1993) (noting that the "live television
coverage of Smith's trial delivered titillation [and] sex ... in abundance").
Other televised courtroom dramas that have delivered spectacles of sexual or sex-related
misconduct include the "Big Dan's Tavern" gang rape case, THALER, supra, at 33-34; the Lorena
Bobbitt penile mutilation trial, Ruth Ann Strickland & Richter H. Moore, Jr., Cameras in State
Courts: A Historical Perspective, 78 JUDICATURE 128, 135 (1994); the New Hampshire trial
where Pamela Smart was convicted for sexually luring three students into killing her husband,
THALER, supra, at 67; and the McMartin Pre-School child sexual abuse trial, id. at xxi.
2. Televising trials involving violence is perhaps too common a phenomenon to require
documentation. However, the existence of this phenomenoncan be easily established by reference
to televised murder trials, including those of Joel Steinberg, THALER, supra note 1, at xiv;
Pamela Smart, id. at 67; the Menendez brothers, Christo Lassiter, TV or Not TV-That Is the
Question, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 928, 966 n.225 (1996); and O.J. Simpson, id. at 930
& n.11.
3. The "lurid testimony," THALER, supra note 1, at 41, broadcast during the William
Kennedy Smith trial included references to ejaculation and penile stimulation. Id. at 41-42 (quot-
ing the New York Post's transcript of Smith's explicit, televised testimony about his encounter
with his accuser); see also Don Kowet, Courting a Growing Audience on Cable, WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 1991, at El (statement of New York Post columnist Amy Pagnozzi) ("'All day long
words like urination, ejaculate and fellatio had been zinging out .... '"). Even the nation's most
outspoken advocate of televised trials, Court TV founder Steven Brill, asked the following
rhetorical question after the Smith trial: "'Can covering a famous family's rape trial, and feasting
[VOL. 49:1
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Romance.7 Racial and ethnic tension.' Strange and interesting characters.9
Celebrities."0 Based-upon-a-true-story realism." Creative, overly enthusias-
on testimony about parties and panties and bars and bras, be anything other than a good, long
profitable leer?'" THALER, supra note 1, at 70.
4. CHRISTOPHER A. DARDEN, IN CONTEMPT 331 (1996); Thaler, supra note 1, at xiv; Henry
L. Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man, NEw YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 56,
57.
5. THALER, supra note 1, at 4-5; see also George D. Prentice, II, Broadcast Cameras in the
Courtroom: Window or Peephole?, CT. MGMT. & ADMIN. REP., Sept. 1992, at 1, 14 ("It seems
to many that we have become a nation of voyeurs, contentto enjoy the public spectacle of scandal
as television entertainment, rather than as a means of furthering the cause of popular de-
moeracy.").
6. THALER, supra note 1, at 33 (discussing the Claus von Bulow trial, where the defendant
was accused of "injecting [his wife] on two separate occasions with potentially lethal doses of
insulin" in order to inherit the bulk of her estate).
7. The romances that have found their way into televised criminal trials are often of the
twisted or failed variety. Examples include the relationship between teacher Pamela Smart and
her students, id. at 67; the unhealthy alliance between Joel Steinberg and his live-in companion,
Hedda Nussbaum, id. at xiv; the John and Lorena Bobbitt marriage, Calabresi, supra note 1; and
the stormy marriage between O.J. and Nicole Brown Simpson, DARDEN, supra note 4, at 332,
365.
8. Although the O.J. Simpson case is often cited as the primary example of a televised
courtroom proceeding that highlighted racial tension, Roger Cossack, What You See Is Not
Always What You Get: Thoughts on the O.J. Trial and the Camera, J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
555, 562 (1996), it is, unfortunately, far from the sole example. Other televised courtroom
dramas that have highlighted racial and ethnic tension include the 1980 Florida trial of policemen
charged in the beating death of Arthur McDuffie, THALER, supra note 1, at 30, 214 n.47; the
state court trial of the Los Angeles police officers accused of beating Rodney King, id. at 50-52;
and the Los Angeles trial of two African Americans accused of attempted murder in an attack on
truck driver Reginald Denny following the Rodney King verdict, id. at 52-53.
9. Televised courtroom proceedings have featured such diverse characters as "the most
famous necrophilic-necrophagistin American History," serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer, A Riddle
Wrapped in a Mystery Inside an Enigma, NEW YORKER, Dec. 12, 1994, at 45, 45; THALER,
supra note 1, at 60-61; Calabresi, supra note 1; Hustler magazine owner Larry Flynt, George
Gerbner, Trial by Television: Are We at the Point of No Return?, 63 JUDICATURE 416, 424
(1980); the three U.S. Marines "charged with... assault for the beating of a [gay bar]
patron ... while shouting 'Clinton must pay!,'" Harris, supra note 1, at 823 n.285; and former
law student and "'all-American boy'" Ted Bundy, the murderer of at least two college coeds,
THALER, supra note 1, at 30; David Gelman, The Bundy Carnival, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1989,
at 66, 66. However, for an assortment of unusual people, the O.J. Simpson case is difficult to
surpass. Its characters included a porn actress, the bitter ex-husband of the lead prosecutor, a
racist cop who peppered his screenplay project with racial slurs and later denied ever using them,
a marine sergeant/aspiring actor/body builder whose recollections were based upon one of his
dreams, and Brian "Kato" Kaelin, a freeloader who lived in Simpson's guest house. DARDEN,
supra note 4, at 153, 253-55, 286, 289-90, 297-98, 344.
10. Given the American fervor for celebrities, the fact that the William Kennedy Smith
acquaintance rape trial and the O.J. Simpson murder trial were not only the most widely watched
courtroom dramas, but also among the most widely watched events of any type, should perhaps
come as no surprise. See, e.g., TIMOTHY R. MURPHY, A MANUAL FOR MANAGING NOTORIOUS
3
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tic, and downright bizarre strategies. 2 Suspense, mystery, and high dra-
ma. 3 The modem American criminal14 trial has everything that a television
CASES xiii (1992) (noting the long-standing, "enormous American appetite for celebrity drama");
THALER, supra note 1, at 38 (statement of reporter Jeff Greenfield of the ABC news program
Nightline regarding the William Kennedy Smith trial) ("'When a member of the most celebrated,
controversial family in America battles a charge of sexual misconduct [and] when the presence
of cameras in the courtroom guarantees that we will see the rich and famous in moments of
supreme stress, . . . we are hooked.'"); The Hon. Clarence Thomas, Victims and Heroes in the
"Benevolent State, " 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671, 677 (1996) (observing that "society is
preoccupied with celebrities"); Richard Lacayo, Trial by Television, TIME, Dec. 16, 1991, at 30,
30 ("No one should have expected that the first court case to claim a huge television audience
would center on municipal-bond trading. With a famous name linked to a sordid crime, the rape
trial of William Kennedy Smith fits neatly into the usual daytime schedule of leering soap
operas."); Betsy Streisand, Can He Get a Fair Trial?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 3, 1994,
at 57, 57 (noting that the O.J. Simpson case "has riveted Americans with its mix of wealth, race,
celebrity, science, obsessive love and domestic violence").
While celebrities are generally defendants in televised trials, they are occasionally
victims. THALER, supra note 1, at 67 (mentioning the televised first-degree murder trial regarding
the shooting death of television actress Rebecca Schaeffer).
11. Several commentators have noted that the success of the televised trial is based in part
upon the audience's voyeuristic thirst for details of others' private lives. E.g., MURPHY, supra
note 10, at xiii (noting the "American appetitefor ... pure, unadulteratedvoyeurism"); THALER,
supra note 1, at 38 (quoting a television reporter's observation that live courtroom tales of
intimate details are addictive); id. at 66 (quoting New Yorker magazine critic James Wolcott's
allegation that Court TV "'is a peephole into a segment of America populated by moral and
mental blanks'"); Leslie Gospill & Julia A. Molander, Cameras in the Courtroom, DEFENSE
COMMENT, Spring 1995, at 7, 8 ("We watch [televised trials], mouths agape, to see if the guy
gets kicked in the groin. Only this time, without a laugh track, these kicks deliver life sentences,
mistrials or multi-million dollar verdicts."); Jim Morrison, Law of the Land: The Real-Life
Dramas Behind Court TV's Incredible Success, SPIRIT, Mar. 1996, at 32, 112 ("Like talk TV,
you're a voyeur [while watching televised trials], peering into the lives of real-life people.").
12. In what one commentator described as "the first made-for-TV trial," a 15-year-old tried
for first-degree murder in Florida for the killing of an 82-year-old widow claimed that he was
prone to violence because he was involuntarily intoxicated by television. Joe Kollin, Reporter
Says Let's Ban Cameras from Courtrooms, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, June 17, 1995, at 48, 48; see
also Strickland & Moore, supra note 1, at 132 (discussing Florida's television coverage of the
trial). In a televised Ohio case, a defendant charged with the rape and murder of a nine-year-old
girl was hypnotized during his trial testimony. Gerbner, supra note 9, at 424. In a Connecticut
trial that was covered extensively on both local and national television, a defendant charged with
manslaughter after a parking dispute blamed his actions on Vietnam-induced post-traumatic stress
disorder. Richard Zoglin, Justice Faces a Screen Test, TIME, June 17, 1991, at 62, 62.
In some televised trials, borderline trial tactics by one party beget similar tactics by the
other party. For instance, in a New Jersey trial of a police officer charged with shooting a 16-
year-old youth, the prosecutor claimed that a former police officer crippled in a shooting was
wheeled into the courtroom as a ploy to generate jury sympathy. He responded in kind,
dramatically holding up the dead youth's coat to the courtroom and television audiences, thereby
exposing a large bullet hole. THALER, supra note 1, at 60.
13. "A trial is a story .... and that's part of the fascination.
It's about people who are in peril. Someone in that courtroom is
[Vol. 49:1
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producer could possibly desire.' 5
either in danger of losing his or her life or losing a lot of money.
And they're trying to fight off that peril. And there's a result. Do
they win? Or do they lose?"
Lassiter, supra note 2, at 929 n.5 (quoting Court TV founder Steven Brill).
As any lawyer who has ever conducted a jury trial can attest, few-if any-times in life
are as charged with tension as the moments awaiting the announcement of a jury's verdict. E.g.,
THALER, supra note 1, at 60, 66-67 ("'Live verdicts are remarkable moments .... I can't
imagine anything with more clear and explicit drama that's ever on TV, anywhere, than a
verdict.'" (quoting a Court TV critic who admitted that he could not go to bed until he heard the
verdict in a trial that he watched)); Lassiter, supra note 2, at 929 n.5 ("A trial, when televised
live.., is also a cliffhanger. Nobody knows the end until the end."); Morrison, supra note 11,
at 112 (statement of Mike Archer, Court TV's executive editor) ("'There's no more dramatic
moment in life than when you sit there and watch somebody listen to a jury's verdict.'").
14. Although civil trials are occasionally televised, this article concentrates on criminal trials,
which make up the majority of televised courtroom proceedings. Harris, supra note 1, at 786;
Prentice, supra note 5, at 13.
15. A substantial overlap exists between fictional and actual courtroom television. THALER,
supra note 1, at 3 (noting that "[i]n the past two decades, 'the court story,' both fictional and
real, has become an integral part of television programming-and the national consciousness. If
television has tried to distinguish the real from the make-believe, it has failed, and for good
reason."). The enormous interest in courtroom drama is underscored by the many successful
fictional television programs, including Perry Mason, L.A. Law, Law and Order, and Murder
One. See Harris, supra note 1, at 808-10; Steven Keeva, Circus-Like Trial Colors Expectation,
A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at 48c, 48c; cf. Harris, supra note 1, at 797 (observing that "[l]awyer
shows, police shows, courtroom dramas-all have been staples of television broadcasting since
its inception, and a part of radio broadcasting before that") (footnotes omitted). In fact, the high
level of drama in televised trials has increased the pressure on fictional courtroom dramas to keep
pace. See, for example, THALER, supra note 1, at 41, stating:
[Tielevision executives suggested that the lurid testimony broadcast during the
[William Kennedy] Smith trial would hardly deter, but rather would encourage
prime-time courtroom dramas to present more explicit story lines and language.
"Now there is no turning back," said Dick Wolf, the executive producer of an
NBC-TV crime series called "Law and Order." "You can't put something
that sounds softened to the viewers after they've seen real-life cases like this.
Parallels between televised trials and other entertainment programming are not
accidental." Court TV executives have declared that their "'goal is to substitute real law for L.A.
Law.'" Harris, supra note 1, at 807. These advisors aim their daytime trial programming directly
at an audience that would otherwise watch soap operas. THALER, supra note 1, at 55 (discussing
Court TV founder's act of selling a fellow Court TV investor "'on the idea that the new network
would be a cross between C-Span and soap opera'"); John Lippman, We, the (19 Jury, L.A.
TMEs, June 30, 1991, (Calendar) at 5 (stating that "Brill and his associates think [Court TV] will
naturally appeal to people who watch daytime soap operas-whose sex, scandal and double-
crossing story lines are not unlike the real-life trials that Court TV hopes to broadcast"); The
Verdict on the Televised Courtroom, ADWEEK, Oct. 17, 1994, at 18, 18 (noting that Court TV's
daytime televised trials attract viewers "who would otherwise be stuck with soap operas and game
shows"); cf. THALER, supra note 1, at 34 (observing that the participants in the Claus von Bulow
case "resembl[ed] characters in a dark soap opera"); Gospill & Molander, supra note 11, at 8
("'It's like a soap-opera,' one male viewer told a TV reporter, explaining why he stays home
1997]
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Even better, the cost of producing these "made-for-television" events
is remarkably low. Unlike the high-priced actors who star in fictionalized
television dramas, the "talent" in courtroom dramas, including judges,
lawyers, defendants, victims, witnesses, and jurors, is never paid by the
television executives who profit from the drama generated. After paying for
the minimal production expenses of a camera, a microphone, a mile or two of
cable, a live remote truck, and an "expert" commentator or two back in the
studio, 6 the television network has financed all of its costs. 1
7
While a criminal trial has significant profit potential, crime victims
generally have nothing to gain-and quite a bit to lose-from their encounters
with the criminal justice system. Crime victims often receive little or no
compensation for their frequently significant economic and noneconomic
losses. 8
This article documents the disparity of the economic treatment between
those who televise trials and those who are unfortunate enough to participate
in them as crime victims. As an admittedly small, but nonetheless constructive,
step toward correcting this disparity, a portion of the economic gain derived
from televising criminal trials should be shifted from television producers to
from work to watch. 'It draws you in.'").
Real and fictional television courtrooms occupy parallel universes in yet another fashion
that furtherdocuments the entertainmentpotential of televised trials. Court proceedingssometimes
spawn the semi-fictionalized accounts known as television docudramas. Perhaps the most
prominent recent examples of this phenomenon were the three competing docudramas based upon
the case of Amy Fisher, a teenager who shot the wife of her alleged lover, Joey Buttafuoco. See
THALER, supra note 1, at 82-84; Harris, supra note 1, at 812. In perhaps an even more unusual
intersection between the real and the fictional courtroom, Court TV presented a two-hour
summary of the San Diego trial of Betty Broderick, accused of shooting her former husband and
his second wife, during the same week that CBS presented a docudrama based on the same
events. See THALER, supra note 1, at 67.
16. Despite the low cost to individual producers, the assembled personnel and equipment can
be substantial if enough different media outlets cover the same trial. The O.J. Simpson trial
coverage accumulated over 1000 reporters and support personnel, over 800 phone lines, 2
transformers, 50 miles of television cable, and 25 media trailers. S.L. Alexander, The Impact of
California v. Simpson on Cameras in the Courtroom, 79 JUDICATURE 169, 169 (1996); The
Simpson Case by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 2, 1994, at E2.
17. See, e.g., Gerbner, supra note 9, at 418 (stating that "[d]ifferentkinds of programs serve
the same basic formula: they assemble viewers and sell them at the least cost"); id. at 425 ("It
cost ABC an estimated $2 million to field the crew and carry the [Ted Bundy trial], a good
investment by program cost and ratings standards."); Gospill & Molander, supra note 11, at 12
(observing that "the networks delight at the discovery of this relatively inexpensive new way to
sell soap"); Paul Raymond, The Impact of a Televised Trial on Individuals' Information and
Attitudes, 75 JUDICATURE 204, 204 (1992) (noting "the low production costs associated with
televising trials"); Lippman, supra note 15, at 75 (quoting a former news director for the
principle that the television news industry "'is all about the development of programs at low
cost'").
18. See infra text accompanying notes 152-202.
[Vol. 49:1
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crime victims. Part II documents the phenomenal growth of televised trials and
argues that, despite claims to the contrary, the primary purpose of televising
trials is generating profit through entertainment. Part III discusses the plight
of crime victims. Finally, Part IV proposes and defends against certain
criticism a system where courts would charge fees for the privilege of
televising trials and then forward those fees to crime victims.
II. CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM
Despite arguments against televised trials and attempts to limit them,
televised trials are largely a growth industry. In recent years, television
producers have steadily increased their access to state courtrooms, even with
vocal and occasionally vehement opposition. As a result, the debate about
whether cameras should and will be allowed into state19 courtrooms is largely
19. Cameras have had far less access to federal courtrooms, and the debate about whether
they should be allowed in these courtrooms continues. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
that became effective in 1946 included Rule 53, which excludes cameras from federal criminal
trials. FED. R. CRIM. P. 53; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: FAIR TRIAL AND FREE
PRESS § 8-3.8 commentary at 54-55 & n.7 (3d ed. 1991) [hereinafterABA STANDARDS]; Laralyn
M. Sasaki, Note, Electronic Media Access to Federal Courtrooms: A Judicial Response, 23 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 769, 771-72 & n. 15 (1990). Despite the absence of a similar provision in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the ban has effectively been expanded to both civil and
criminal trials. Id. at 769 & n.4. On several occasions, federal court policy makers revisited the
issue of cameras in federal courts and reaffirmed the ban. E.g., COMM. ON THE OPERATION OF
THE JURY SYS., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REVISED REPORT ON THE "FREE
PREss-FAIR TRIAL" ISSUE, 87 F.R.D. 519, 535-36 (1980) [hereinafter REVISED REPORT]; Cf.
Nancy T. Gardner, Note, Cameras in the Courtroom: Guidelines for State Criminal Trials, 84
MICH. L. REv. 475, 482-83 (1985) (discussing judicial canons and committee standards
upholding the ban).
However, in 1990 the U.S. Judicial Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on Cameras in the
Courtroom proposed a three-year pilot project to test the viability of allowing cameras into federal
courtrooms. See Judicial Conference Votes Down Cameras, NEws MEDIA & L., Fall 1994, at 3,
3; Prentice, supra note 5, at 9. The three year experiment (which actually lasted three and one-
half years) permitted cameras in some civil cases in six of the ninety-four federal districts.
Judicial Conference Votes Down Cameras, supra, at 3; Strickland & Moore, supra note 1,
at 128. Although the judges who participated reported no ill effects from the presence of cameras
in their courtrooms and the Federal Judicial Center recommended expansion of television
coverage, the Judicial Conference voted 19 to 6 to terminate the program. Judicial Conference
Votes Down Cameras, supra, at 4; Tony Mauro, FederalJudges Ban Cameras from Courtrooms,
QUILL, Nov. 1994, at 54; see also Strickland & Moore, supra note 1, at 128 (describing the vote
as nearly two-to-one); cf. Alexander, supra note 16, at 172 (noting speculation that the O.J.
Simpson trial contributed to the termination); Lassiter, supra note 2, at 931 & n.17 (reporting
judges' concerns that television cameras in courtrooms negatively affect courtroom dignity and
the jurors and witnesses); ABA Backs Test of Televised Trials, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Mar. 18,
1995, at 20, 20 (noting effort to persuade Judicial Conference to reconsider its ban).
The Judicial Conference also voted to recommend that the 13 federal circuits adopt
orders prohibiting broadcasting of court proceedings. Jonathan Groner & Richard Barbieri,
7
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over. Consequently, public policy recognizing cameras in courtrooms as a fact
of modem life should be adopted now.
A. Cameras in Courtrooms: A Brief Historical Perspective0
To fully understand the history of cameras in courtrooms, one must
start before the dawn of television. At that point in time, cameras were already
creating their share of controversy in and around American courtrooms.
2'
1. The Pre-Television Era
In 1917 the Illinois Supreme Court advised trial court judges to bar
cameras from courtrooms.' Similarly, ten years later the Maryland Court of
Appeals affirmed contempt citations of reporters who violated a trial court's
prohibition of photographing criminal proceedings.13
The first broadcasted trial, albeit through radio, was the 1925 Scopes
"monkey trial. "2 Following expansion of coverage to include radio
broadcasters, newspaper photographers were also given courtroom access, 1
and extensive criticism resulted from the news media's enthusiastic trial
Federal Judiciary Opens Window to Cameras in Court, RECORDER (San Francisco), Mar. 13,
1996, at 1; John Flynn Rooney, U.S. Judges Here Vote to Codify Ban on Televising Trials, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., June 18, 1996, at 1. In March 1996 the Judicial Conference partially withdrew
this recommendation by resolving that each circuit could decide for itself whether to allow
broadcasts of some appellate arguments. Four More Circuit Courts Vote Not to Allow Cameras,
NEws MEDIA & L., Summer 1996, at 22, 22; Groner & Barbiere, supra, at 1; Tony Mauro,
Federal Courts Cleared to Use TV Coverage, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 1996, at 1. Only the
Second and Ninth Circuits have approved televising appellate arguments. Four More Circuit
Courts Vote Not to Allow Cameras, supra, at 22. The 1st, 5th, 7th, 10th, and 1 th Circuits have
officially rejected cameras. Id.; cf. John Flynn Rooney, 7th Circuit Bans Cameras in Its Courts,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 31, 1996, at 1 (discussing ban in Seventh Circuit).
For an in-depth review of cameras in federal courts, see generally Sasaki, supra.
20. For a more complete history of cameras in the courtroom, see generally Lassiter, supra
note 2, at 936-59, and Strickland & Moore, supra note 1, at 129-35.
21. Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-75 (1980) (discussing
English and American history of allowing court proceedings to be open to the public and press).
22. People v. Munday, 117 N.E. 286 (I11. 917), noted in THALER, supra note 1, at 19.
23. Exparte Sturm, 136 A. 312, 316 (Md. 1927). The Sturm decisiondernonstrates that press
ingenuity and persistence are not recent creations. Id. at 313 (discussing how a newspaper
photographer relinquished a blank plate, instead of the plate with the defendant's picture, in
response to the judge's request for the photographic plate containing the defendant's picture).
24. Gregory C. Read, Fade to Black: A Defense Perspective on Cameras in the Courtroom,
in THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM: VORTH PRESERVING 29, 29 (Donald J. Hirsch ed., 1996)
(citing Ruth Ann Strickland & Richter H. Moore, Jr., Cameras in State Courts: A Historical
Perspective, 78 JUDICATURE 128, 130 (1994)).
25. THALER, supra note 1, at 20.
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss1/3
1997] CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM
coverage. 26
The full storm of criticism would have to wait for the next "Trial of the
Century." In 1935 Bruno Richard Hauptmann was tried for kidnapping and
murdering the baby of aviator Charles Lindbergh.27 A newsreel camera was
hidden in the courtroom and soundproofed so well that most trial participants,
apparently including the judge, did not discover its existence until trial footage
was shown in approximately 10,000 of the nation's 14,000 movie theaters.2 s
The newsreel footage made the Hauptmann trial "the first to show trial
proceedings by audio-visual technology to a remote [viewing audience]."29
The six-week trial was also covered by 700 reporters and 120 cameramen,
four of whom were given courtroom access to take pictures during recesses. °
The "carnival-like atmosphere" 3 of the trial generated an intense negative
reaction from the organized bar and others.32
2. ABA Canon 35
The backlash against the bedlam caused by reporters and photographers
during the Hauptmann trial led to the ABA's adoption of Canon 35, which
banned all courtroom photography.33 As originally adopted by the ABA in
26. See Strickland & Moore, supra note 1, at 129 (calling the trial "[o]ne of the greatest
circuses in the annals of the American judicial process"). In apparent recognition of the potential
negative effect of courtroom broadcasts upon attorneys, see infra note 68, the attorneys were
given the mistaken impression that the broadcast had only a limited range outside the courtroom.
THALER, supra note 1, at 20.
27. THALER, supra note 1, at 22; Read, supra note 24, at 29.
28. THALER, supra note 1, at 22; see also Read, supra note 24, at 29 (noting that the trial
was broadcast in "approximately 10,000 movie theaters around the country").
29. Lassiter, supra note 2, at 936.
30. Read, supra note 24; cf. THALER, supra note 1, at 22 (stating 132 as the number of
cameramen present).
31. Lassiter, supra note 2, at 936.
32. E.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, at 55 (indicating the occurrence of a "[w]ide-
spread reaction within the organized bar to the apparent disgrace of the system of justice,
prompted by the 'carnival' atmosphere of the trial"); THALER, supra note 1, at 22 (noting the
reaction of "scholars, journalists, and legal authorities ... to what was widely perceived as a
media circus both inside and outside the Hauptnann courthouse" and quoting one woman's
description of the courtroom scene as "a 'Roman holiday' where 'photographers clambered on
the counsel's table and shoved their flashbulbs into the faces of witnesses'").
33. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, at 55; Lassiter, supra note 2, at 937; see also The
Honorable John F. Onion, Jr., Mass Media's Impact on Litigation: A Judge's Perspective, 14
REV. LITIG. 585, 589 (1995) (noting ban resulted from the way the press "made a sort of
mockery of ... the Lindbergh baby trial"); cf. Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Story Behind the
Adoption of the Ban on Courtroom Cameras, 63 JUDICATURE 14, 14 (1979) (stating that "the
photographers outside the Lindbergh trial-not the ones inside-caused the commotion that led
to a total ban on courtroom photography"); Prentice, supra note 5, at 1 (noting that a "circus-like
atmosphere surrounding the [trial] prompted a ban on televised court proceedings"); Strickland
9
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1937,"4 Canon 35 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibited judges from
allowing "[t]he taking of photographs in the court room" and "the broadcast-
ing of court proceedings," due to concerns about the "dignity and decorum"
of court proceedings.35 In 1952 Canon 35 was amended to explicitly ban the
televising of court proceedings.36 Most states, with three exceptions, 37
adopted the Canon 35 ban on cameras in the courtroom. 3
3. Three States Allow Cameras
In 1956 Colorado became the first state to explicitly reject ABA Canon
35 and allow televised trials. 39 However, even before Colorado renounced
ABA Canon 35, two other states had allowed televised trials. Television
cameras were first allowed in courtroom proceedings in a 1953 trial in
Oklahoma City to tape proceedings for evening news broadcasts.4" The first
& Moore, supra note 1, at 130 (noting that "[a]lthough the New Jersey Court of Appeals saw no
major problem with the conduct of the Hauptmann trial, the ABA reconsidered the role of
cameras in the courtroom due to the reported carnival-like atmosphere of the Hauptmann trial").
34. Prentice, supra note 5, at 6.
35. As originally drafted, the complete Canon 35 read:
Improper Publicizing of Court Proceedings. Proceedings in court should
be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The taking of photographs in the
court room, during sessions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the
broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential
dignity of the proceedings, degrade the court and create misconceptions with
respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted.
62 A.B.A. REP. 767 (1937).
36. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, at 55; Richard H. Frank, Cameras in the Courtroom:
A First Amendment Right of Access, 9 COMM/ENT L.J. 749,755 (1987); Prentice, supra note 5,
at 6.
37. The number of states that did not adopt or follow ABA Canon 35 may be two or three,
depending upon how one counts. See infra note 40 (noting that Oklahoma technically adopted
ABA Canon 35, but nonetheless allowed the first televised trial).
38. See Frank, supra note 36, at 755-56.
39. In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 296 P.2d 465,
468-69, 472 (Colo. 1956); see also Strickland & Moore, supra note 1, at 130-31 (summarizing
Justice Otto Moore's opinion for the Colorado Supreme Court ruling and emphasizing his position
"that citizens should be educated about the functioning of all branches of government"); Carolyn
E. Riemer, Note, Television Coverage of Trials: Constitutional Protection Against Absolute
Denial of Access in the Absence of a Compelling Interest, 30 VILL. L. RIv. 1267, 1269 & n. 10
(1985) (addressing Colorado's allowance of cameras in state courtrooms before and after due
process problems were recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court); Prentice, supra note 5, at 6
(discussing Colorado's local rule). In 1968 the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed a first-degree
murder conviction, despite the defendant's assertion that a television camera in the courtroom
prejudiced his rights. Gonzales v. People, 438 P.2d 686, 687-88 (Colo. 1968).
40. THALER, supra note 1, at 25; Frank, supra note 36, at 756; Sasaki, supra note 19,
at 774. Although Oklahoma theoretically followed ABA Canon 35, it did not enforce its ban on
televised trials. See THALER, supra note 1, at 213 n.33.
[Vol. 49:1
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live televised trial took place two years later in Waco, Texas, "with the
approval of the judge, the jury, and even the defendant," Harry Washburn.4
When asked whether he objected to live television coverage, Washburn
inadvertently prophesied, "'Naw, let it go all over the world.'"42
4. Estes v. Texas:43 The U.S. Supreme Court Speaks
Some of Washburn's fellow Texas criminal defendants did not share his
enthusiasm for television coverage. Former Lyndon B. Johnson aide Billie Sol
Estes' appealed his swindling conviction to the United States Supreme Court,
claiming that television coverage45 had denied him a fair trial.46 A sharply
divided Court wrote six opinions and reversed the conviction.47
Four members of the Court apparently believed that television coverage
was inherently prejudicial to a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process
right to a fair trial.4" Justice Harlan, who provided the critical fifth vote,
agreed that television coverage in the Estes trial was prejudicial, but refused
to agree to a blanket prohibition of television coverage in state courts. 49
41. THALER, supra note 1, at 26; see also Frank, supra note 36, at 756 (noting how reaction
to the coverage was favorable); Sasaki, supra note 19, at 774 (same). Although the effect of
Canon 35 upon the judge's decision to allow television coverage of the Washburn trial is unclear,
Texas did eventually join Colorado in rejecting Canon 35's ban on televised trials. THALER,
supra note 1, at 26 & 213 n.33.
42. THALER, supranote 1, at xix (citing TelevisedTrial, World'sAttentionAttractedto 1995,
WACO TRiB. HERALD, July 23, 1978, at C1).
43. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
44. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, at 55.
45. The extensive coverage of the pretrial proceedings may have been the key to Estes's
successful appeal. See THALER, supra note 1, at 28; Frank, supra note 36, at 756-57 & n.39; cf.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, at 55 (noting "more than a dozen cameramen [were] jockeying
their equipment about the courtroom" during a pretrial hearing). The live television coverage
of the actual trial was limited to the prosecution's opening statement and closing argument and
the return of the verdict. Estes, 381 U.S. at 537.
46. Estes, 381 U.S. at 535-38.
47. Id. at 534-617.
48. Id. at 534-55.
49. Id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring) (concluding that the defendant's right to a fair trial
was infringed upon in this case by allowing cameras in the courtroom, but asserting that a blanket
prohibition of cameras "would doubtless impinge upon one of the valued attributes of our
federalism by preventing the States from pursuing a novel course of procedural experimenta-
tion"); see also Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 573 (1981) ("[I]t is fair to say that Justice
Harlan viewed the holding as limited to the propositionthat 'what was done in this case infringed
the fundamental right to a fair trial assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'" (quoting Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 587
(1965)) (emphasis in Chandler opinion)).
1997]
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5. The Florida Experiment
Florida took advantage of the opening provided by Justice Harlan's
limited concurrence. In 1977 the Florida Supreme Court sponsored a pilot
project allowing the use of television and still cameras without the consent of
the participants on an experimental basis.50 The critical test case was State
v. Zamora,5' where a fifteen-year-old boy charged with murdering an elderly
neighbor claimed that he suffered from "involuntary television intoxication" 2
that made him prone to violence.53 Buoyed by the favorable report of the
Zamora judge, the Florida Supreme Court opened the state's trial courts to
television coverage, subject to control by trial judges.54
6. Chandler v. Florida:55 The Supreme Court Speaks Again
The Florida Supreme Court's opening of its state courthouses to
television coverage56 led to the next United States Supreme Court challenge
to televised trials. The Chandler decision arose out of the televised trial of two
Florida police officers charged with conspiracy to commit burglary. 57
The Chandler majority held that television coverage of a criminal trial
does not automatically render the trial violative of due process." With this
50. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 347 So. 2d 402, 403 (Fla. 1977); see also
THALER, supra note 1, at 29-31 (summarizing the Florida pilot project and its impact on
subsequent state proceedings); cf. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 327 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla.
1976) (approving an experimental program involving cameras in one civil and one criminal trial
upon the consent of participants).
51. 361 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1978).
52. Strickland & Moore, supra note 1, at 132 (stating the defense attorney "charged that TV
has induced his insanity through involuntary subliminal intoxication" (citing George Gerbner,
Trial by Television: Are We at the Point of No Return?, 63 JUDICATURE 416, 424 (1980))).
53. THALER, supra note 1, at 29-30; see also supra note 12 (suggesting that Zamora was
ideal for televised coverage).
54. Strickland & Moore, supra note 1, at 132; cf. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc.,
370 So. 2d 764, 781 (Fla. 1979) (allowing electronic media access to state courtrooms "[i]n view
of the lack of any serious problems of disruption occurring during the term of the pilot
program").
55. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
56. After allowing television coverage of trials, the Florida Supreme Court rejected a
defendant's challenge to the televising of his trial. See Maxwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 967, 970
(Fla. 1983) ("The televising of a trial does not per se impinge on the right to fairness and
impartiality. A motion to limit or exclude television coverage must attempt to show with
specificity that it will deleteriously affect the trial." (citing Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560
(1981))).
57. Chandler, 449 U.S. at 567-68.
58. Id. at 582-83 ("[B]ecause this Court has no supervisory authority over state courts, our
review is confined to whether there is a constitutional violation. We hold that the Constitution
[Vol. 49:1I
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ruling, the Supreme Court opened the floodgates to television coverage of state
criminal trials.
Z The Few Become the Many
From a rather inauspicious beginning in three southwestern states,
television cameras have steadily marched into courtrooms in almost every
state. Until 1973 only two states had officially adopted rules allowing
television coverage of court proceedings. 9 By 1978 the number of states
allowing television coverage had increased to six.' In 1978 the Conference
of Chief Justices almost unanimously adopted a resolution that advocated state
court experimentation with televised trials.6" Just two years after this action,
the number of states allowing cameras jumped to twenty-eight. 62 By 1985
at least forty states were allowing cameras in their courtrooms.63 The total
swelled to forty-five in the early 1990s. 4 In 1993 the total reached its current
does not prohibit a state from experimenting with [televised trials]."). The Chandler Court did
recognize that "in some cases, prejudicial broadcast accounts of pretrial and trial events may
impair the ability of jurors to decide the issue of guilt or innocence uninfluenced by extraneous
matter." Id. at 575.
59. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, at 54 n.3; see also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 544
(1965) ("Forty-eight of our States and the Federal Rules have deemed the use of television
improper in the courtroom."); Gardner, supra note 19, at 475 ("In 1965, only two states
permitted photographic and electronic media coverage of courtroom proceedings.") (footnotes
omitted). However, although Oklahoma had officially adopted Canon 35's prohibition of cameras
in the courtroom, it apparently did not enforce this prohibition. See supra note 40. Therefore,
the actual number of states allowing cameras in the courtroom through the early seventies was
three: Colorado, Texas, and Oklahoma. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
60. See Lassiter, supra note 2, at 940 & n.61.
61. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, at 56 & n.12; see also David Graves, Cameras in the
Courts: The Situation Today, 63 JUDICATURE 24, 25 (1979) (noting 44 of the 46 state chief
justices approved the resolution, with South Carolina casting the sole dissenting vote).
62. See Frank, supra note 36, at 762 n.73; cf. Prentice, supra note 5, at 5 ("[A]t the time
the Court issued its decision in Chandler v. Florida, 29 states allowed some form of camera
coverage in their courtrooms.") (citation omitted); Chandler, 449 U.S. at 565 n.6 ("As of
October 1980, 19 states permitted coverage of trial and appellate courts, 3 permitted coverage
of trial courts only, 6 permitted appellate court coverage only, and the court systems of 12 other
states were studying the issue."); REVISED REPORT, supra note 19, at 536 (reporting 26 states
in 1980). Perhaps the differing reports result from differing interpretations or calculations of rules
permanently allowing cameras and rules allowing experiments with cameras. See, e.g., Graves,
supra note 61, at 24 (noting that as of 1979 "seven states have now adopted permanent rules
giving the media the right to photograph courtroom proceedings, and 15 other states have
experimented with camera coverage").
63. Riemer, supra note 39, at 1294 & n.101; see also Gardner, supra note 19, at 475 (43
states in 1985).
64. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, at 54 n.3; MURPHY, supra note 10, at 37 (listing
45 states in 1992); Prentice, supra note 5, at 6 (listing 45 states in 1991).
1997]
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level of forty-seven.' The only states now that do not allow cameras or
broadcasts in their courtrooms are Indiana, Mississippi, and South Dakota.'
Some of the forty-seven states that allow cameras or broadcasts from their
courtrooms limit or prohibit television access to some proceedings, including
criminal proceedings. 7
Nonetheless, the camera is a juggernaut that has forged its way into
state courtrooms with considerable force. Although a largely academic debate
about the propriety of the camera's presence continues,68 the camera is a part
65. THALER, supra note 1, at 31; Lassiter, supra note 2, at 929; Joseph E. Martineau &
Mary B. Schultz, Cameras in Missouri's Courtrooms: Supreme Court Administrative Rule 16, J.
Mo. B., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 379, 382; Read, supra note 24, at 31 & n.21.
66. Read, supra note 24, at 31. The District of Columbia also forbids any cameras in its
courtrooms. Lassiter, supra note 2, at 930.
67. See, e.g., Lassiter, supra note 2, at 929 n.8 ("While 47 states permit live television
coverage of trials in some form, only about 26 states regularly allow cameras in the court-
room."); Strickland & Moore, supra note 1, at 128 ("Televised trials, appellate proceedings, or
both are now a reality in 47 states, and 35 allow filming of criminal trials."). For a list of states
permitting cameras in the courtroom, see Read, supra note 24, at 31 n.21. For charts breaking
down the states into categories of permissible television access to courts, see Alexander, supra
note 16, at 170, and Strickland & Moore, supra note 1, at 134. A detailed state-by-state chart
is included in Ann J. Reavis et al., Cameras in the Courtroom, in DRI FIRST ANNUAL MEETING
1, 54-66 (1996).
68. Those opposing cameras in the courtroom have often argued that cameras detract from
the dignity of trials; adversely affect lawyers, judges, jurors, witnesses, and other trial
participants; make it more difficult for defendants to receive fair trials; add additional burdens
to an already overtaxed court system; and can lead to violence outside the courtroom. See, e.g.,
Lassiter, supra note 2, at 965-78 (providing arguments in opposition to cameras in the courtroom
based on a lack of reliable coverage, prejudicial impact on the trial participants, and the need to
maintain dignity and decorum in the courtroom); Brian V. Breheny & Elizabeth M. Kelly, Note,
Maintaining Impartiality: Does Media Coverage of Trials Need to Be Curtailed?, 10 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 371 (1995) (arguing that media coverage does not need to be curtailed in
order to maintain jury impartiality); Jack G. Day, The Case Against Cameras in the Courtroom,
JUDGES' J., Winter, 1981, at 18 (discussingwhy videotaping or televising of trials should remain
forbidden); Kenneth L. Pedersen, Just Say No to Cameras in the Courtroom, ADVOCATE, Aug.
1996, at 13 (arguing that cameras in the courtroom detract from the accuracy of the judicial
system and make justice difficult to attain).
Those who support cameras in the courtroom counter that cameras can educate the public
and increase understanding of the court system, see infra note 93 and accompanying text; can
result in the public being shown the whole story rather than bits and pieces selected by
journalists; can increase public confidence in the judicial system; can have either no effect or a
positive effect on trial participants; do not cause problems in high-profile trials because the real
cause is publicity; and aid the public in its oversight of the judicial system. See, e.g., Eugene
Borgida et al., Cameras in the Courtroom, 14 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 489, 504-07 (1990)
(discussing results of a study examining the psychological effects of cameras in the courtroom);
Harris, supra note 1, at 818-21 (discussing the benefits of Court TV); Floyd Abrams, Yes:
Cameras Reflect the Process, for Better or Worse, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995, at 36, 36 (arguing that
cameras in the courtroom accurately present the behavior of judges and attorneys); Charles-
Edward Anderson, Trial by Press?: Pretrial Publicity Doesn't Bias Jurors, Panelists Say,
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of the landscape of state courtrooms, perhaps irretrievably so.69
Almost twenty years ago, Washington attorney and former Federal
Communications Commissioner Lee Loevinger told ABA delegates who were
debating the wisdom of televised trials, "You're fooling yourselves. I don't
think we have any choice. We'll continue to get television coverage whether
we like it or not."'7 He was right. No state7' that has approved cameras in
its courtrooms has reversed that decision and later banned them.72
The strength of the camera's position in the courtroom is best illustrated
by the aftermath of the O.J. Simpson criminal trial. In the trial's wake, debate
concerning the wisdom of televising trials was prominent. 3 Many doubted
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1990, at 32, 32 (noting that three panels of judges, lawyers, journalists,
psychologists, and social scientists agree jurors are unaffected by pretrial publicity); Stephen E.
Nevas, The Case for Cameras in the Courtroom, JUDGES' J., Winter, 1981, at 22 (presenting
arguments in favor of televising or videotaping trials).
69. See THALER, supra note 1, at xxi (statement of McMartin Pre-School prosecutor Pamela
Ferrero) ("'We don't talk about courtroom cameras anymore-peoplejust accept them as a matter
of course. . . .'"); id. ("One point remains clear: Once television has infiltrated a critical arena
of American sociopolitical life, it seems to find a permanent home."); Gerbner, supra note 9,
at 426 ("Once televised trials attract a large national following, the process will be irresistible,
cumulative, and probably irreversible."); Morrison, supra note 11, at 114 ("[Ihe controversy
over cameras in courtrooms seems to be fading, though a few naysayers remain."); Zoglin, supra
note 12 ("One of the lessons of the media age is that the TV juggernaut is hard to reverse.").
Television's irreversible force is not solely an American phenomenon. The Honourable
Justice MD Kirby, Televising Court Proceedings, 18 U. N.S.W. L.J. 483, 485 (1995) ("Every
sensible person can see that, the technology of information having moved along, courts and
judges can scarcely expect to keep the cameras out of Australian courts forever.").
70. Gerbner, supra note 9, at 417 (quoting Bar Association Again Backs Ban on Television
and Radio in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1979, at A16).
71. New York is the only arguable exception. New York's legislature has enacted several
statutes allowing television access to the courtroom, each with a sunset clause that eliminated the
statutory authority for televised trials on a date certain. On several occasions, the sunset clause
has come into play and thereby banned access for short periods of time. However, on each of
these occasions the legislature has adopted a new statute that again allowed cameras into New
York courtrooms. THALER, supra note 1, at xxi, 56-57, 73-79; cf. Keeping the Cameras On,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Feb. 6, 1995, at 44 (discussing the recent passage of a New York bill
that allows cameras in the courtroom).
72. Daniel Stepniak, Televising Court Proceedings, 18 U. N.S.W. L.J. 488,490 (1995); see
also Sasaki, supra note 19, at 770 n.6 ("No state, having completed access experimentation, has
concluded that such coverage should be prohibited."); cf. Simpson and Cameras, EDITOR &
PUBLISHER, July 1, 1995, at 8 ("We cannot foresee that the legislatures of 47 states are going to
rescind their approval.").
73. Lassiter, supra note 2, at 930; Bill Kisliuk, Judicial Council to Weigh Cameras in
Courtrooms, RECORDER (San Francisco), Oct. 30, 1995, at 1; see also Alexander, supra note 16,
at 170 (noting how following the trial, "[California] Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas appointed a
12-member Task Force to Review Photographing, Recording, and Broadcasting in the
Courtroom"); Harriet Chiang, Task Force Debates Merits of Cameras in Court, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 9, 1996, at A16 (reporting on testimony presented to the task force).
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whether states should continue to allow the practice, but these doubts had little
practical effect. Only a few trial court judges indicated that the Simpson
television coverage affected their decisions to deny the televising of particular
trials.74 No state has withdrawn its rule permitting broadcasting of trials since
the Simpson criminal proceedings began,75 and some states have even
expanded television's access to their criminal trials." In the months following
the start of the trial, the leading network televising criminal trials reported
greater success in securing court permission to allow televising of trials,
increasing to a rate of more than 95%.' If the negative attention generated
by the Simpson criminal trial did not kill, or even wound, the televised Ameri-
can78 state court trial, probably nothing will.
74. E.g., Jamie Beckett, Cameras Barred at Klaas Trial, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 6, 1996, at 1
(discussing the use of cameras in the Davis trial); Elizabeth Gleick, Sex, Betrayal and Murder,
TmE, July 17, 1995, at 32, 32 (implicitly suggesting that Judge William L. Howard's decision
to bar cameras from the Susan Smith child drowning trial resulted from the happenings in the
Simpson trial); Ken Hoover, Verdict Still Out on Cameras in Courtrooms: Klaas Case Illustrates
Courts'Shift, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 22, 1996, at A17 (discussing the effect of the Simpson case on
the use of cameras in the courtroom in the Davis trial); Jill Smolowe, TV Cameras on Trial,
Tam, July 24, 1995, at 38, 38 (discussing the impact of the Simpson trial on the Susan Smith
trial and the Richard Allen Davis trial involving the murder of Polly Klaas).
75. Cf. Alexander, supra note 16 (examining state-by-state reactions to the Simpson trial and
not finding any withdrawn allowances of cameras). The California Judge's Association executive
board voted against endorsing a proposed ban on cameras in California's courtrooms. CIA Board
Votes Narrowly to Oppose Ban on Cameras, RECORDER (San Francisco), Feb. 14, 1996, at 3;
cf. Alexander, supra note 16, at 172 ("The presiding judge in the Simpson case, Lance Ito, after
the trial expressed his strong support for courtroom cameras. . . ."). The California study
ultimately resulted in changes to, but not withdrawal of, California's rules allowing cameras. See
CAL. R. 980; see also Reavis et al., supra note 67, at 25-26 (discussing the revised rule).
76. According to a published report on the effect of the Simpson trial:
Four states reported changes in the status of courtroom cameras since the
advent of the Simpson trial: Idaho ... began a one-year experiment with
cameras in trial courts on February 15, 1995. Missouri ... made permanent the
rules allowing cameras in trial courts on July 1, 1995-the same date North
Dakota ... also made trial court coverage permanent. And Tennessee voted in
December to experiment with broadening camera access.
Alexander, supra note 16, at 170.
77. Betsy Streisand,And Justice for All?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 9, 1995, at 47,
51 ("Since the Simpson trial started, Court TV ... has been granted access to 47.of the 49 trials
for which it has applied-a batting average higher than normal.").
78. American states are not the only governments that have studied, debated, and struggled
with the camera's role in trials. For discussions of cameras in courtrooms outside the United
States, see Kirby, supra note 69 (Australia); Lassiter, supra note 2, at 932-33 & nn.21-25
(Canada, England, Ireland, Scotland, and Italy); A. Wayne MacKay, Framing the Issues for
Cameras in the Courtrooms:Redefining JudicialDignity and Decorum, 19 DALHOUSiE L.J. 139
(1996) (Canada); Stepniak, supra note 72 (Australia); Stephen A. Metz, Comment, Justice
Through the Eye of a Camera: Cameras in the Courtrooms in the United States, Canada,
England, and Scotland, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 673 (1996) (Canada, England, and Scotland);
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B. The Modem Televised Trial
With relatively rare exceptions, television cameras in courtrooms used
to be utilized only to secure snippets for the evening news.7 9 While this
practice continues,8" many trials are now televised at length to regionals or
national audiences.
The televised trial helped launch a successful cable television network,
Court TV,' and generated widely watched programming for other networks.
Court TV's daytime programming consists almost entirely of live coverage of
trials from across the country.83 In fact, Court TV and other networks often
televise highly publicized trials gavel-to-gavel. 1 For instance, CNN televised
D'Arcy Jenish & Sharon Doyle Driedger, LegalLesson or Soap Opera?, MACLEAN'S, Mar. 13,
1995, at 35, 35 (Canada); Michael S. Serrill, Murder Most Depraved: The Prosecution of
Accused Schoolgirl Killer Paul Bernardo Is "Canada's Trial of the Century, TIME, June 19, 1995,
at 25, 25 (Canada); cf. W.H. & Hillary Kessler, Tadic Trial Primer, AM. LAW., Sept. 1995,
at 59, 59 (noting Court TV's plans for coverage of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia in The Hague, Netherlands).
79. See supra text accompanying note 40.
80. See Kollin, supra note 12, at 37 ("No pictures for your 6 o'clock newscast? Go to the
courthouse and shoot a trial or hearing. It's easy, available and cheap. It may not be important,
but with the voice of an authoritative-sounding reporter it will sound cataclysmic.").
81. See infra text accompanying note 86 (noting regional coverage of the Big Dan's Tavern
gang rape case); see also Court TVMulls Regional Coverage, ADWEEK, Oct. 10, 1994, at A1,
All ("Court TV founder/ceo Steven Brill said he is considering adding regional feeds in several
states to Court TV's national service."); Court TV's Steve Brill: Witness for a Nation,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Feb. 6, 1995, at 43, 47 [hereinafter Court TV's Steve Brill]
(considering statewide Court TV for some cases).
82. Court TV founder Steven Brill claims that the idea for the network came to him in a taxi
when he heard a report about local television coverage of the Joel Steinberg murder trial.
THALER, supra note 1, at 55; Lippman, supra note 15, at 65; Morrison, supra note 11, at 111.
"As presently constituted, Court TV is a joint venture of four companies... : Time Warner,
Inc., Liberty Media Corp., Cablevision Systems Corp., and the National Broadcasting
Company." Harris, supra note 1, at 800-01 (footnote omitted); see also Prentice, supra note 5,
at 3 (listing the three companies that launched Court TV). In February 1997, when his effort to
buy back Court TV from Time Warner failed, Brill left the network. See Richard Turner, Sudden
Exit of a Would-Be Mogul, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 10, 1997, at 74, 74.
When Court TV started on July 1, 1991, it was broadcast in about four million homes
with cable television. Morrison, supra note 11, at 112. It is now available in about half of the
nation's households. Id. at 116.
83. Harris, supra note 1, at 802 (noting that in addition to 11 hours of live coverage daily,
Court TV replays lengthy trial excerpts during the overnight hours).
84. Court TV has televised hundreds of trials. Cossack, supra note 8, at 556 ("By the time
the Simpson trial started, Court TV had already televised some 200 trials in its short histo-
ry . . . ."); Lassiter, supra note 2, at 928 & n.3 (noting more than 340 trials were televised by
Court TV as of June 1994); Read, supra note 24, at 30 ("[B]y 1996 Court TV had broadcast
almost 500 court proceedings. . . ."). But see THALER, supra note 1, at 64 ("Court TV is not
entirely gavel to gavel, nor is it necessarily live television.").
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the four-month Claus von Bulow trial;' and when CNN covered the Big
Dan's Tavern gang rape case, a local cable television system joined in the
coverage. 6 Both CNN and Court TV televised the William Kennedy Smith
date rape trial." The O.J. Simpson trial exceeded the coverage of all these
trials by generating live coverage for months on CNN, Court TV, and E!
Entertainment Network. 88
Nationally televised trials generate much more than just live coverage.
Network and local newscasts increase their viewer appeal with dramatic
episodes from not just the famous trials, but other televised trials as well. 9
Television "news magazines," such as Inside Edition, Current Affair, 48
Hours, and Prime Time Live, cover notorious cases at length. Highly
publicized trials sometimes spawn evening shows featuring panels of legal
experts discussing courtroom events of the day.' ° Excerpts from televised
As television critic David Bianculli noted regarding the William Kennedy Smith trial,
"'The CNN coverage isn't so much gavel-to-gavel, actually, as gavel-to-commercial-to-gavel,
with former. CNN Gulf War correspondent Charles Jaco acting more as ringleader than
reporter.'" Id. at 48.
85. Id. at 34.
86. Id. at 36.
87. Id. at 39, 48.
88. Read, supra note 24, at 30 & n.l1; Gospill & Molander, supra note 11, at 8; Steven
Brill, ACLU Should Support Cameras in Court, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., June 30, 1995,
at 9. CNN, Court TV, and El Entertainment Network combined for 2000 hours of live trial
coverage. Alexander, supra note 16, at 169.
In an interesting example of the "where I stand depends upon where I sit" phenomenon,
Court TV's Steven Brill roundly criticized E!'s coverage of the trial:
I would hope that [E!'s Lee Masters] would want to think twice before he again
allows something calling itself the Entertainment Network to televise gavel to
gavel a double-murder trial.
While I would join Masters in court to fight for E!'s right to share in the
Court TV camera feed from the O.J. Simpson trial, I sure would love to have
a drink with Lee one night and ask him why it doesn't further coarsen society
and cheapen tragic events when a channel that calls itself the Entertainment
Network carries a double-murder trial gavel-to gavel, anchored by a diet-food
pitchwoman, and complete with gossip reports and commentary from hair
stylists and a dog psychologist.
It's not illegal, and shouldn't be. It's just wrong.
Brill, supra, at 9. Given Court TV's prurient quest for ratings and advertising sales, see infra
notes 104-05 and accompanying text, Brill's protestations ring rather hollow.
89. See, e.g., THALER, supra note 1, at 39 (noting that excerpted versions of the testimony
of alleged William Kennedy Smith victim Patricia Bowman dominated newscasts); Harris, supra
note 1, at 811 ("Given the demands of the typical half-hour newscast, even top news stories on
television seldom get more than 'tiny bites' of air time .... In these constraints, . . . those
producing television news programs naturally pick the most dramatic slice of the day's events
that they can.") (footnote omitted); The Simpson Case by the Numbers, supra note 16, at E2
(noting that NBC Nightly News with Tom Brokaw contained a story on the O.J. Simpson criminal
case on 73 evenings).
90. THALER, supra note 1, at 65; Bill Carter, After the Verdicts, Will Case Still Sell?, N.Y.
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trials even find their way into programs aimed toward children. 9' In a real
sense, these rather frequent megatrials seem to generate television-driven
industries of their own.'
C. That's Entertainment (and Big Business)
Advocates of continued and expanded presence of cameras in court-
rooms primarily argue that televised trials educate the public about the judicial
system. 93 Notwithstanding this oft-cited justification, the most likely motiva-
TIMiES, Feb. 6, 1997, at A15 (describing numerous court-related television shows started during
the O.J. Simpson trial); Morrison, supra note 11, at 114 (describing Court TV's program, Prime
Time Justice).
91. Joe Mandese & Jeff Jensen, 'Trial of Century,' Break of a Lifetime, ADVERT. AGE,
Oct. 9, 1996, at 1, 1 ("[O]n Oct. 8, Nickelodeonwas scheduled to run a half-hour news program
about the Simpson trial and all its possible ramifications as they pertain to children.").
92. See Wendy Kaminer, No: Tabloid TelevisionDoes Not Belong at Trial, A.B.A. J., Sept.
1995, at 37, 37 ("[The Simpson case is an industry worth more than the gross national product
of a small country."); Carter, supra note 90, at A15 (describing the O.J. Simpson trial as "the
greatest gravy train in media history").
93. See, e.g., THALER, supra note 1, at xxii ("Mhe camera helps the nation construct a
clearer 'reality' of the American courts, which can only enhance and legitimize the processes of
law and renew faith in the justice system."); id. at 68 ("[Court TV founder Steven] Brill
maintains that Court TV is 'going to help people understand the important legal issues that affect
their lives . . . .'"); Gospill & Molander, supra note 11, at 8, 10 ("[There's a certain
educational factor to Court TV. 'Probably 75 percent of the public now knows about preliminary
hearings,' [Rob Bunzel] says."); Harris, supra note 1, at 818 ("[I]t seems safe to say that viewers
of Court TV will be educated by the experience, at least to some degree."); Frank, supra
note 36, at 795 ("The potential educational value of electronic access is frequently suggested as
one of its primary benefits."); Gardner, supra note 19, at 492 ("Televised trials, if broadcast in
an undistorted fashion, can educate the public about its judicial system, thus satisfying the
public's constitutional 'right to know.'"); Abrams, supra note 68, at 36 ("The presence of the
camera ... seemed likely.., to better inform the public about what was happening in a
particularly celebrated case."); Hoover, supra note 74, at A18 ("[A] news media attorney argued
that television coverage of Davis' trial could help educate the public about the criminal justice
system."); Strickland & Moore, supra note 1, at 135 ("Public knowledge of the operation of the
courts, distorted by television shows and movies, can be enhanced by television in the courtroom,
allowing viewers to become better educated about the cumbersome as well as sensational aspects
of the judicial process."); see also Harris, supra note 1, at 817 (describing the results of a study
whereby viewers of television trials became more knowledgeable than non-viewers about the
judicial process); Raymond, supra note 17, at 209 (same).
Opponents of televised trials do not concede that television educates viewers about the
justice system. See, e.g., THALER, supra note 1, at 80 ("[R]esearch concluded that public
knowledge, or lack of it, about the judicial process was the same whether court cameras were
present or not .... It concluded that televised coverage of trials had no effect whatsoever on the
level of public knowledge of the judiciary."); Lassiter, supra note 2, at 973 ("lit is by no means
certain that actual viewing of courtroom performance gavel-to-gavel has achieved substantial
educational or confidence-inspiringresults."); Gardner, supra note 19, at 491 ("According to the
Judicial Conference Ad Hoe Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, media coverage of state
19971
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tions for televised trials suggest that an idealistic or altruistic desire to educate
television audiences has very little to do with the growth of the televised trial
industry. Instead, two other longstanding American values, entertainment94
and capitalism,95 are driving this growth.
Although the trial as a television profit center may be a relatively recent
phenomenon, the trial as an entertainment vehicle is nothing new. Even before
the birth of the United States, judicial proceedings were spectacles.96 When
the United States was a rural, slower-paced nation, trials would draw large
audiences to crowded courtrooms.' The modem public fascination with
court proceedings has not resulted in increased public understanding of the courts. Rather than
educating the public, the manner of televising has often resulted in miseducation and a distortion
of the trial."); Lincoln Caplan, Sport TV, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 23, 1995, at 18, 20 ("Followers
of the new legal journalism may pick up lawyerly lingo, but they get little guidance in
understanding the significance of the events reported or even in following the narrative of those
events."); Gerbner, supra note 9, at 420 ("The problem is that the opaque reality of the
courtroom is less illuminating of the judicial process than is translucent fiction. One must go
behind the scenes to see how things really work. Surface appearances are more likely to conceal
than to reveal how the judicial system operates."); Prentice, supra note 5, at 13 ("One could
argue that broadcast cameras in the [Rodney King] courtroom did little, if anything, to educate
and inform the public about how trials are really conducted.").
Some commentators even maintain that trials are not and should not be designed to
educate the public. See, e.g., THALER, supra note 1, at 58 (statement of William Kennedy
Smith's defense attorney Roy Black) ("'The whole purpose of the trial is not to educate people,
It's to decide whether or not a citizen in this community is guilty of a crime and should be
punished by going to prison.'"); Sasaki, supra note 19, at 789-90 ("Judge Nauman S. Scott of
the Western District of Louisiana echoed many respondents' views: 'The purpose of the
courts . . . is to dispense justice; not to educate the public.'"); Day, supra note 68, at 19 ("The
judicial process is not designed or intended to educate, inform, or entertain the public. It is a
search for truth."); Hoover, supra note 74, at A18 ("'The purpose of this trial is not to educate
the public about anything,' snapped the [Richard Allen Davis trial] judge."); cf. Lassiter, supra
note 2, at 973 ("Mhe claims made for confidence-inspiring and general education-building can
be served without sacrificing courtroom autonomy by providing extensive news coverage, expert
commentary, and panel discussions outside the courtroom."); Day, supra note 68, at 20 ("[T he
media's educationalgoals are poorly defined. Do they want to explain the judicial process, clarify
court procedures, or let the public know that justice is being done?").
94. See Susanne Roschwalb, Does Television Belong in the Courtroom?, USA TODAY MAG.,
Nov. 1994, at 69, 69 ("That the chief appeal [of the O.J. Simpson criminal trial] lay in its
entertainment value may not be a very high-minded conclusion, but it seems inescapable when
entertainment has become the primary force in American media.").
95. See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
96. Of course, the history of judicial proceedings includes well-attended events that are no
longer part of the modern criminal justice system, such as public executions. See Gerbner, supra
note 9, at 421 ("The most widely frequented shows in London just emerging from the Middle
Ages were public executions. . . ."); cf. Gilbert Geis, A Lively Public Issue: Canon 35 in the
Light of Recent Events, A.B.A. J., May 1957, at 419, 421 (quoting an editorial comparing the
first trial covered on live television to public executions); Antoinette Bosco, Murder as
Entertainment, LADIEs HOME J., Nov. 1994, at 144, 148 ("They used to throw Christians to the
lions. Now they watch court trials.").
97. Gerbner, supra note 9, at 421-22 (statement of Chief Justice Warren) ("'In early frontier
[Vol. 49:1
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televised trials is simply an extension of this centuries-old public interest in
high stakes courtroom drama.98 However, drama99 is predominantly a form
of entertainment, not education." °
America, when no motion pictures, no television, and no radio provided entertainment, trial day
in the country was like fair day, and from near and far citizens young and old converged on the
county seat. The criminal trial was the theater and spectaculum. .. ."); Strickland & Moore,
supra note 1, at 129 ("When the United States was less populous, predominantly rural, and more
homogeneous,. . . [p]eople could.., travel in a leisurely manner to the county seat to
participate in the judicial process. Court days were festive days, with the trials as the center of
the community's interest.") (footnote omitted); Frances Kahn Zemans, Public Access: The
Ultimate Guardian of Fairness in Our Justice System, 79 JUDICATURE 173, 173 (1996) ("In the
early days of our country, we were made up of a number of small towns.... [UIn those days
trials were truly public forums. They were attended by the public.").
98. See Morrison, supra note 11, at 112, 114 ("Once courtrooms provided entertainment,
civic lessons, and expiation for communities. Court TV allows anyone to become a courthouse
buff from the comfort of a couch, without worrying about incurring a judge's wrath by talking,
eating, or cheering for one side.").
Similar to the long-held value of trials as sources of entertainment, cases of great
notoriety are also "not a new phenomenon." MURPHY, supra note 10, at xiii (listing "[tihe Salem
witch trials, the trial of Aaron Burr, the Scopes trial, the Lindberg kidnapping case, the Sacco
and Vanzetti trials, as well as the trials of Alger Hiss, Dr. Sam Sheppard, the Chicago 7,
Roxanne Pulitzer, and the Watergate defendants" as examples).
Even the "trial of the century," an event that seems to take place about once a decade,
dates back to the first of this century. Onion, supra note 33, at 588-89 ("In 1906 ... there was
the trial of Harry Thaw, accused of killing Stanford White, the most famous architect that New
York had ever produced. . . . Well, there was a love triangle and some of the testimony in the
trial was rather spicy.... It was quite sensational. It was billed then as the 'trial of the
century.'").
99. Even when the leaders of Court TV have espoused the alleged educational value of
televised trials, they admit that the drama of the courtroom is a critical element of the network's
programming. Gospill & Molander, supra note 11, at 8 (statement of Court TV spokesperson
Lynn Rosenstrach) ("'Certainly the public's interest (in courtroom drama) has always been
there-based on the numerous successful TV shows, movies and books. So, the entertainment
value may draw viewers to us, too.'"); Morrison, supra note 11, at 114 ("Why do people watch?
Brill suggests a combination of entertainment and civic interest.. . . '[I]t's dramatic. Courtrooms
are places where people have combat.'").
Observers outside Court TV have noted that entertainment is a critical part of its
product. THALER, supra note 1, at 5 ("[Court TV] may be successful if Brill can effectively
convert judicial proceedings into a sort of television theater imbued with typical entertainment
values."); Chris Petrakos, Television Robs Courtroom of Jurisdiction, QUILL, Jan.-Feb. 1995,
at 42, 42 (describing Court TV as "that strange blend of entertainment and justice").
100. StevenKay, Playing TheirPart, LAWYER, Mar. 7, 1995, at 17 ("However the argument
is dressed-up, be it in educational clothes or the right of the public to see justice done, it comes
don to entertainment."); cf. Petrakos, supra note 99, at 42 ("[I]n the rush to cover these
[trials]-and many times, to try to justify the coverage as an act of service to the public-the
media have created a hunger for sensation that will entirely supersede people's thirst for
information and knowledge."); Prentice, supra note 5, at 3 ("The public's right to know and its
need to be educated about the legal system will become secondary to television's only real
skill-to entertain its viewers."); id. at 13 ("Even ABC's Ted Koppel, in describing the media
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Television is largely an entertainment medium,' and viewers watch
trials primarily for entertainment purposes.'O When network executives
decide which trials to televise gavel-to-gavel, they look not for the trials
that will best educate their viewers, but for those that will draw the most
viewers. 3 Televised trials often feature at least one, if not some combina-
tion, of the three pillars of American entertainment: sex, violence, and celebri-
ties."° When television reporters choose trial excerpts for newscasts and
excitement over the Smith case, conceded 'if there is any public interest that is being served here,
it is first, last, and foremost our prurient interest.'").
Other countries have covered U.S. trials, see, e.g., THALER, supra note 1, at 39, and
American networks have televised coverage of foreign trials, see, e.g., id. at 71. Because
believing that citizens of various countries are tuning in to educate themselves about the nuances
of other countries' judicial systems is difficult, the more likely motivation is to be entertained.
101. NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES To DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF
SHOW BUSINESS 87 (1985) ("Entertainment is the supra-ideology of all discourse on television.
No matter what is depicted or from what point of view, the overarching presumption is that all
is there for our amusement and pleasure."); see also THALER, supra note 1, at 4 ("Simply stated,
we watch television because it is entertaining."); Prentice, supra note 5, at 11 (discussing
Postman's book).
102. Kaminer, supra note 92, at 37 ("The televising of sensational cases .... often is billed
as educational, but the public's interest in them seems mostly prurient. People who claim they
watch the Simpson case to educate themselves about the system remind me of people who say
they buy Playboy for the articles."); Mark Whitaker, Whites v. Blacks, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16,
1995, at 28, 29 ("For the past 16 months [of television coverage of the Simpson criminal
proceedings], most Americans had consumed the proceedings as entertainment.. ").
103. Cf. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 580 (1981) ("Selection of which trials, or parts
of trials, to broadcast ... will be governed by such factors as the nature of the crime and the
status and position of the accused-or of the victim; the effect may be to titillate rather than to
educateand inform."); Gerbner, supra note 9, at 420 ("Trials will be picked and edited to fit...
dramatic ritual.").
One of the first nationally televised megatrials, the William Kennedy Smith date rape
prosecution, demonstrates aptly that entertainment-not education-is the primary goal for
network executives. They featured this trial not because of the need to focus public attention on
the problems of date rape, but because it involved a member of a famous (and infamous)
American family. See THALER, supra note 1, at 45 ("In a 'Nightline' report, Ted Koppel stated,
'Indeed, if you wanted to argue that televising a rape trial raises public sensitivity on the issue,
you could find a dozen rape cases on any given day which would do the job more effectively and
with far fewer distractions.'"); cf. id. at 44 (quoting television reporter Jeff Greenfield's
observation that the trial was "'of no conceivable importance as a legal landmark'").
104. Prentice, supra note 5, at 13 (stating that the trials that television networks broadcast
'usually involve at least one of three elements: sex, graphic violence, or a celebrity participant");
see also THALER, supra note 1, at 67 ("Of the [first 76] trials selected [by Court TV], more than
half focused on crimes of violence, with 30 trials involving murder or homicide and 14 dealing
with assault, police brutality, sexual abuse, or rape."); Alan M. Dershowitz, Yes: Its
Commercialism Hides Its Potential, A.B.A. J., May 1994, at 46, 46 ("Court TV seems to
specialize in the salacious, the violent and the emotional. Its choices of trials to televise could as
easily have been made by the producers of Oprah, Sally, Phil and Geraldo."); Eileen Libby, No:
Tacky or Not, It Helps Bring the Law toLife, A.B.A. J., May 1994, at 47, 47 ("Like a carnival
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magazine shows, they look for clips loaded with drama, conflict, or controver-
sy.'1 Television is a highly competitive business where programming
decisions are made to boost ratings, not to impart knowledge." °
The packaging of televised trials further demonstrates that they are an
entertainment enterprise. Dramatic music and graphics open many broad-
casts. 11 Trials are covered like sporting events, complete with expert
analysts reporting on which side is "scoring points" in the courtroom. 08
barker who lures the public into the tent with glimpses of flesh, Court TV often must appeal to
baser human instincts. For old-fashioned, all-American entertainment, nothing beats the real
thing: That's why trials about patricide, sexual mutilation or baby buying draw the largest
numbers."); cf. THALER, supra note 1, at 13 ("[A] trial may simply be showcased because of the
singularly lurid and sensational aspects attached to the case.").
105. THALER, supra note 1, at 4 ("Video clips from trial proceedings are not unlike the
television commercial itself, or other types of entertainmentprogramming. The visuals are chosen
to excite the senses . . . ."); id. at 81 ("'We're journalists and we're not necessarily historians
or educators,' [Fox News executive producer Paul Smimoff] said, candidly, 'We're in the
commercial news business here.'"); Emilio Viano, Victims, Crime and the Media: Competing
Interests in the Electronic Society, CoMM. & L., June 1995, at 41, 45 ("Quantitively, the media
present a considerable amount of violence, both as entertainment and as part of the news.").
Sensational trial excerpts often displace coverage of more traditional news events. See
THALER, supra note 1, at 39 ("Macro issues, such as widespread unemployment and a deeply
entrenched recession, took a back seat on the media agenda [during the William Kennedy Smith
trial]."); cf. DARDEN, supra note 4, at 262 ("Spy magazine reported that one poll showed
that more Americans could identify Lance Ito (64 percent) than Newt Gingrich (52 percent). In
another poll, Kato Kaelin was recognizable to 75 percent of those who responded, while Vice
President Al Gore was identified by only 25 percent.").
106. As Justice Clark predicted in 1965, "realistically it is only the notorious trial which will
be broadcast, because of the necessity for paid sponsorship." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 545
(1965).
Recent experience with televised trials has proven him right. See Kaminer, supra
note 92, at 37 ("If television executives are given general access to the nation's courts,
what proceedings will they choose to cover? ... High-profile cases that can be most profitably
televised, appealing to the most advertisers, will enjoy the most attention."); Lassiter, supra
note 2, at 977 ("[W]hen rating wars for televised trials commence, commercial television
inevitably slides toward the tabloid marketing lure of sex, power, and the perverse.") (footnotes
omitted); cf. THALER, supra note 1, at 64 ("Ads have not readily poured in [during Court TV's
early months], placing pressure on the network to promote and cover more sensational trials to
boost ratings and ad revenues."); id. at 67 ("[Clearly the network has commercial interests in
mind as it chooses among the most dramatic trials to boost its appeal."); Harris, supra note 1,
at 788 ("Court TV selects the trials it televises for their appeal to viewers."); Prentice, supra
note 5, at 3 (noting that "[Court TV founder Steven] Brill proudly proclaimed that the broadcast
coverage of the Smith trial in Florida 'easily outdistanced most of the competing soap operas and
talk shows.'").
107. See Robert C. Lind, Defender of the Faith in the Midst of the Simpson Circus, 24 Sw.
U. L. REV. 1215, 1223-24 (1995) (reviewing REx S. HEINKE, MEDIA LAW (1994)).
108. See THALER, supra note 1, at 74; see also id. at 42 (comparing a newspaper's conduct
during the William Kennedy Smith trial to a "race-track handicapper"); Lind, supra note 107,
at 1223 n.22 ("Commentators attempt to make it a sporting event by discussing which side has
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Also instructive is the fact that televised trials are often described in terms
borrowed from entertainment industries. Televised trials have been called
circuses, 09 carnivals,110 soap operas,"' morality plays,"' and even bull-
fights."' After all, the coverage is designed to attract viewers, not to educate
them. 114
By this standard, televised trials are enjoying spectacular success.
Ratings for the most celebrated trials have been astronomical. Millions of
Americans watched portions of the O.1. Simpson criminal proceedings,"15
'won' at the end of the day."); Caplan, supra note 93, at 20 ("Legal journalism is increasingly
like sports and political reporting, a form of play-by-play."); Joshua Lazerson, Court TV: Can
It Increase Understanding of Law and the Legal Process?, 76 JUDICATURE 57, 57 (1992)
(comparing the value of the commentary of Court TV to that of Monday Night Football);
Lippman, supra note 15, at 5 (stating that a legal expert's method of giving television
commentary regarding a witness's testimony was similar to "delivering color commentary on a
football game"); M.L. Stein, O.J. Media Circus Threatens TrialAccess, EDITOR & PUBLISHER,
May 27, 1995, at 16, 16 (statement of Gerald F. Uelmen, a member of the Simpson legal team)
("'The trial is reported like a football game, and we're told how far each play moved the ball up
or down the field.'").
109. E.g., MURPHY, supra note 10, at 42; THALER, supra note 1, at 40; Stepniak, supra
note 72, at 490; Gospill & Molander, supra note 11, at 10; Keeva, supra note 15, at 48c; Henry
J. Reske, Courtroom Cameras Face New Scrutiny, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at 48d, 48d; Simpson
and Cameras, supra note 72, at 8; M.L. Stein, Disturbing Pattern, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Sept.
9, 1995, at 11, 11; Whitaker, supra note 102, at 35; Bill Ainsworth, Assembly OKs Court
Cameras Bill, RECORDER (San Francisco) Apr. 26, 1996, at 3.
During the Claus von Bulow trial, reporters went even further, by referring to the trial
as "The Greatest Show on Earth." THALER, supra note 1, at 34. Perhaps they would do well to
remember the admonition of reporter Jeff Greenfield during the William Kennedy Smith trial:
"'[W]hen a member of the press calls an event like this a media circus, he is overlooking the fact
that he, too, is probably one of the clowns.'" Id. at 44.
110. E.g., THALER, supra note 1, at 28, 67; Lassiter, supra note 2, at 936, 938; Deborah
Graham, In the Simpson Spotlight, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at 49, 49; Stein, supra note 108, at
16.
111. E.g., Calabresi, supra note 1, at 56; Gates, supra note 4, at 60; Rikki J. Klieman, ...
But a Camera in the Courtroom Should Not Take the Blame, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 10, 1995, at § 1;
Stein, supra note 109, at 33.
112. Stein, supra note 108, at 16; cf. Chandlery. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 580 (1981) (stating
televised trials can often resemble "'Yankee Stadium' 'show trials'"); THALER, supra note 1,
at 66 (referring to "the real-life transmission of current trials ... as . . . 'the cinema verit6 of
due process'"); Gates, supra note 4, at 60 (referring to the Simpson trial as theatre).
113. Geis, supra note 96, at 421.
114. Cf. Caplan, supra note 93, at 20 ("[I]n NBC's broadcast last Tuesday .... anchorman
Tom Brokaw counted down the minutes until the Simpson verdict as if it were the dropping of
the New Year's ball in Times Square or the last moments of a football game.").
115. About one in four homes watched Simpson's preliminary hearing. Simpson on TV in
1 of 4 Homes, N.Y. TimEs, July 2, 1994, at L20 (statement of David Poltrack, an audience
researcher for CBS) (noting additionally that "[the statistic] would be supplemented, of course,
by a significant out-of-home audience, since it ran in the lunch hour for most of the country'").
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and an astounding 150 million people watched the verdict live.'16 Other
televised trials have also generated huge audiences." 7 Even less notorious
trials generate significant viewership."'
Large television audiences lead to significant profits. The Simpson trial
contributed "about $25 million in incremental revenues" to CNN's cof-
fers." 9 Although Court TV does not release its revenue figures, it presum-
ably earned significant additional revenue during the trial' because it had
roughly twice as many daytime viewers as CNN.' Even outside the highly
publicized Simpson trial, networks that televise trials have generated significant
revenue from advertising sales.'" Commercial television networks, like
The Simpson trial has been described as "the longest-running live television event in
history." Brill, supra note 88, at 8. It generated both unprecedented coverage and tremendous
audiences, including foreign audiences. See Lassister, supra note 2, at 930 & n.10; cf, DARDEN,
supra note 4, at 260 (detailing an enormous amount of press coverage); Alexander, supra note
16, at 169 (noting extensive television coverage in the United States); Caplan, supra note 93, at
20 ("CNN's ratings increased five-fold when it televised the Simpson proceedings.").
116. Alexander, supra note 16, at 169; Read, supra note 24, at 30; Whitaker, supra note
102, at 31; cf. ALAN M. DERSHOWrrZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 11 (1996) ("The world seemed to stand still for a moment in
time. Everyone would remember where they were when the verdict was announced in the case
of The People of the State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson. They were either watching
television or listening to radio."); Cossack, supra note 8, at 556 (stating that 96% of all people
watching television at the time saw the verdict); Mandese & Jensen, supra note 91, at 41 (stating
that "50% of U.S. TV households were tuned to their sets [during the verdict], compared with
a daytime average of about 30%"). Indeed, the Simpson verdict was probably "the 'most
watched event in TV history.'" Read, supra note 24, at 30.
117. See TVTrials Captivate Viewers, Educate Our Juror Pool, DEFENSE COMMENT, Spring
1995, at 13 ("[Fully 43% of the American public watched at least four of five of the most
sensational trials aired on TV within the past few years."); see also THALER, supra note 1, at 39
("CNN reported that 3.2 million viewers-nine times what the network draws during those
hours-tuned in [to the William Kennedy Smith trial] to watch the two-day-long testimony of the
alleged victim, Patricia Bowman."); id. at 58 ("Brill ... noted that his primary competitor,
CNN, more than tripled its usual audience [during the Smith trial] and that Court TV typically
outdistanced CNN where both were broadcast."); Lacayo, supra note 10, at 30 (discussing the
Smith trial); Gerbner, supra note 9, at 424 ("Ratings [for the Zamora "involuntary subliminal
intoxication" murder trial] reportedly exceeded those of the Johnny Carson Show."),
118. Cf. Calabresi, supra note 1, at 56 ("In the first Nielsen survey of [Court TV's]
viewership in October, the channel ranked No.4 during the day among cable viewers who receive
it."); TV Trials Captivate Viewers, Educate Our Jury Pool, supra note 117 (44% of those
surveyed watched Court TV "regularly" or "sometimes").
119. Mandese & Jensen, supra note 91, at 1.
120. Id. ("[Court's TV's] ratings are known to have increased multi-fold from the trial and
so-presumably-have its revenues.").
121. See Morrison, supra note 11, at 109. Additionally, one reporterhas estimated that rates
for advertising aired during the Simpson verdict announcement "command[ed] up to ten times the
normal rate." Read, supra note 24, at 30 n.12.
122. In mid-1995, Court TV boasted viewership in almost 18 million cable homes, helping
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other businesses, are driven to increase revenue." In addition to generating
revenue by selling advertising, networks also profit by selling other products
and services, including courtroom feeds sold to other networks 24 and trial
videotapes sold to lawyers."z
The profit motive does not necessarily render televising trials improper
or distasteful." However, policies regarding televising trials should recog-
nize the reality that producers televise trials to generate revenue through
entertainment. They are not engaging in a self-sacrificing endeavor to educate
the public.
it to break even less than five years after it went on the air. Court TV's Steve Brill, supra
note 81, at 46; Gospill & Molander, supra note 11, at 8; cf. Morrison, supra note 11, at 117 ("'I
can't say I planned it this way,' Brill says. 'But it happens we are the only consumer name when
it comes to law.'").
Advertising sales have been key to this commercial success. As one commentator noted:
Court TV is not a public service venture or a broadcasting outlet devoted to
educating the public without regard to profits. Rather, it is a commercial
venture, just like traditional broadcast and cable networks; it airs advertising.
It differs from traditional networks in what it offers viewers-trials and other
proceedings in real courts. Court TV may help educate and inform the public,
but it does so with the aim of selling of its advertisers' products. This is how
it makes money, and what will determine, in large part, whether or not it stays
on the air.
Harris, supra note 1, at 801; see also THALER, supra note 1, at 64 (noting that eight minutes of
every hour on Court TV are reserved for national and local advertising); Court TV's Steve Brill,
supra note 81, at 46 (stating that in 1995 "advertising will be about 35% of revenue"); cf.
Dershowitz, supra note 104, at 46 ("[Court TV's] commercial goal is to sell advertising time for
cereal, soap and suppositories. And it is doing a fairly good job-by that standard.").
The need to increase advertising revenue undoubtedly affects a network's selection of
trials to televise. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 549-50 (1965) ("The necessity for
sponsorship weighs heavily in favor of the televising of only notorious cases .... Such a
selectionis necessary in order to obtain a sponsor willing to pay a sufficient fee to cover the costs
and return a profit."); Prentice, supra note 5, at 5-6 (stating that critics of Court TV "fear
that the network's for-profit status will inevitably result in the broadcasting of only the most
commercially profitable cases, those involving high publicity content").
123. See Lassiter, supra note 2, at 999 ("The media is business. Big business."); Sasaki,
supra note 19, at 797-98 (quoting a Pennsylvania federal court judge who argued that "'electronic
access to the media is not a law reform issue at all. It is not even administrative reform but
business.'"); cf Nevas, supra note 68, at 24 (noting that many would argue that the news media
"are sure to exploit and distort the legal process for crass commercial purposes").
124. THALER, supra note 1, at 59 (stating that Court TV generated fees during the William
Kennedy Srith trial by charging other networks per diem fees for the use of trial feeds created
by its exclusive pool camera).
125. Court TV's Steve Brill, supra note 81, at 46.
126. Harris, supra note 1, at 801 n.129.
Similarly, the fact that networks televise trials for entertainment purposes does not
diminish the network's free speech protection. In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, 296 P.2d 465, 469 (Colo. 1956).
[Vol. 49:1
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Of course, the networks are not the only ones profiting from televised
trials. The "legal experts" who provide commentary receive income and
publicity.127 When a trial is televised, the trial attorneys receive both fees
and tremendous free publicity." Free publicity also helps state court judges
who must seek re-election."2 Additionally, jurors from highly publicized
televised trials sometimes write books that generate significant royalties.'
31
Tabloids and others sometimes pay witnesses to tell their stories.13 1 Even
criminal defendants are sometimes able to turn trial publicity into an
opportunity to generate income.1
Im. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM'S TREATMENT OF VICTIMS
With relatively rare exceptions,"' crime victims are not fortunate
enough to reap these same economic benefits from trials. Instead of compen-
127. Graham, supra note 110, at 49; Carter, supra note 90, at A15.
128. Cf. Lassiter, supra note 2, at 992 ("Television is a godsend for lawyers competing for
business. . . ."). Network executives sometimes hire lawyers from high-profile cases to host
television shows. See Carter, supra note 90, at A15 (discussing O.J. Simpson prosecutor Marcia
Clark's syndicated television show Lady Law); Cochran Moves Beyond Shadow of the Simpson
Criminal Trial, USA TODAY, Jan. 20, 1997, at 3D (discussing O.J. Simpson defense attorney
Johnnie Cochran's new Court TV program entitled Cochran and Grace). Lawyers also
occasionally turn to that certain income generator-the tell-all book. Deirdre Carmody, In the
World of Books, a Rush to Publish, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at A10; Carter, supra note 90,
at A15.
129. See Gerbner, supra note 9, at 426 ("About 10 per cent [sic] of the electorate can now
identify any judicial candidate during an election. A television trial can easily multiply
that recognition factor for a candidate."). But cf. Lassiter, supra note 2, at 991-92 & n.333
(noting how the commercial appeal of producing a screenplay raised questions about a judge's
impartiality).
130. Cf. Stein, supra note 109, at 33 (noting that some believe jurors will choose "to sell
their thoughts" to book publishers rather than freely interviewing with reporters post-trial).
131. See, e.g., DARDEN, supra note 4, at 236-37; THALER, supra note 1, at 69; cf. Lassiter,
supra note 2, at 989-91 (discussing problems associated with witness marketing); Nina Burleigh,
Preliminary Judgments, A.B.A. I., Oct. 1994, at 55, 60 ("Equally intrusive to the trial procedure
has been the 'cash for trash' phenomenon of potential witnesses selling their stories to tabloid
newspapers and television shows."); Jeffrey Toobin, Cash for Trash, NEW YORKER, July 11,
1994, at 34, 34 (labeling the selling of stories by witnesses as "one of the newest specialties in
the legal market-the brokering of interviews to the tabloid media").
132. SeeLaws That Make Sure Crime Doesn't Pay, CQ RESEARCHER, July 22, 1994, at 632,
632 (discussing books written by criminals and other products arising from their activities);
Jennifer Seter et al., Simpson Trial & Trivia, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 16, 1995, at 42,
42-43 (estimating the revenues received by O.J. Simpson from the sale of phone cards and
football cards signed by Simpson while in jail).
133. Crime victims rarely exercise the option to write a book. To write a profitable book,
a crime victim would necessarily give up even more privacy than is surrendered during a trial.
See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
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sating victims for financial losses, the trial process simply adds to the likely
emotional and often physical pain that accompanies the actual crimes. Even
when televised trials generate substantial income for networks and others,
victims often leave courtrooms empty-handed.
A. Revictimization Through Trial
Unlike many trial participants,"' the crime victim does not choose to
participate in the proceedings.' 35 Instead, she'36 is dragged, sometimes
literally, into the limelight by the perpetrator of the crime.
The victim's problems do not end with the completion of the crime.
Instead, the criminal justice system itself 37 revictimizes"3 s crime victims
134. The attorneys, the judge, and the television crews all participate in televised trials by
choice-presumably to earn their living. Those who might argue that the defendant does not
participate willingly in a criminal trial overlook the fact that any criminal defendant who has
actually committed the crime charged has made a voluntary choice to engage in the activity
that results in the trial. Both the preliminary hearing and the grand jury indictment procedures
provide criminal defendants with due process protection against being wrongfully forced to
participate in trials. See DAviD FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TODAY 42-49, 67-71
(1976); MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON
TRIAL 3 (1975). Crime victims lack similar protection against involuntary trial participation. Only
witnesses subpoenaed against their will and citizens summoned to jury duty share the crime
victims' status as involuntary trial participants.
135. In addition to the fact that the crime victim is brought into the criminal justice system
by the acts of the perpetrator of the crime, the victim does not always have the right to decline
participation in the investigation and trial. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose:
Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1850,
1851-52 & n.6 (1996) (describinga Duluth, Minnesotapractice of interviewingdomestic violence
victims during investigations and subpoenaing such victims to testify at trial-even if they do not
want the investigation and prosecution to proceed).
136. Females are often the victims of the crimes of violence that are the staple of televised
trials, while males constitute the vast majority of those who commit crimes. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1994,
tbl. 5.20 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1995) (stating that 84% of those convicted
in U.S. District Courts in 1992 were male); see also FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 1994, tbl. 2.6, at 16 (1995) (stating that 65.2% of murder offenders were male,
only 6.7% were female, and the remaining 28% were unknown in 1994).
137. Although defense attorneys receive much of the blame for the revictimization of crime
victims, they are not the sole source of these problems. See Maxine D. Kersh, Note, The
Empowerment of the Crime Victim: A Comparative Study of Victim Compensation Schemes in the
United States and Australia, 24 CAL. V. INT'L L.J. 345, 348 (1994) ("The crime victim was
simply a prosecutor's tool. In addition to the suffering caused by the actual crime, she often had
to endure the added trauma of prolonged interrogation."); Andrew L. Sonner, Are New Laws
Needed to Protect Crime Victims' Rights?: No, CQ RESEARCHER, July 22, 1994, at 641, 641 ("In
some jurisdictions, prosecutors, police and judges-not to mention defense attorneys-
-treat victims callously."); cf. Charles S. Clark, Crime Victims'Rights, CQ RESEARCHER, July
22, 1994, at 627, 631 (describing the police act of delivering a blood-stained wallet to a widow
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because this system recognizes rights for the criminal defendant, but not rights
for the crime victim.' 39 In many cases the defense attorney puts the victim
one year after her husband's death "with no letter of explanation").
138. See John Albrecht, The Rights and Needs of Victims of Crime: The Judges' Perspective,
JUDGES' J., Winter 1995, at 29, 30 (discussing the "unintentional adverse effects" of crime
caused in part "by criminal justice agencies"); Laurie Eisenbeiss, Cameras in the Court-
room-The Victim's Perspective, ADVOCATE, Aug. 1996, at 14, 14 ("Many victims feel they are
victimized first by the offender and then by an insensitive criminal justice system. Unfortunately,
the news media provides a third source of victimization."). See generally THALER, supra note 1,
at 36 (analogizing the media's error in publicizing a victim's name to that of a second rape);
Viano, supra note 105, at 41 ("Within the last decade, crime victims and others have begun to
ask whether crime reporting is actually victimizing the victims again.").
139. See Linda F. Frank, The Collection of Restitution: An Often Overlooked Service to
Crime Wctims, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 107, 107 (1992) ("[Clrime victims continue
to be mistreated and neglected within the very system that should provide them with support,
information, and assistance."); Clark, supra note 137, at 627 ("Crime victims, because they
lacked legal standing under state law and the U.S. Constitution, have long been known as the
justice system's 'forgotten people.'"); cf. JAMES GAROFALO & L. PAUL SUTTON, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME: POTENTIAL COSTS AND COVERAGE
OF A NATIONAL PROGRAM 11 (1977) ("Mhe victim of crime in the United States has
commanded only nominal recognition by the criminal justice system.").
In fact, the judicial system sometimes even allows crime victims to be excluded from
trials and sentencing hearings. For instance, when defense attorneys want victims and their
families to be excluded from trials, they list them as potential witnesses and invoke the procedural
rule requiring sequestration of witnesses. See Clark, supra note 137, at 629; see also Sens. Jon
Kyl & Dianne Feinstein, Yes: Victims Deserve Justice No Less Than Defendants, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1996, at 82, 82 (discussing various ways victims' access to trials has been limited). Exclusion
from trial and sentencing and restrictions on displays of emotion are galling to many victims'
families. See Clark, supra note 137, at 629 (statement of Ann Read, associate director of Parents
of Murdered Children) ("'Mhe criminal justice system is all geared to justice for the criminal.
The parent of the murderer can flop all over the court and scream, but if you're the parent of the
murder victim, you can't even blow your nose without the judge calling you into his cham-
ber .... '"). The victims themselves particularly find the limited access and restrictions on
behavior to be frustrating.
"When a person is convicted and sentencing recommendations are made, the
defense can bring in 50 character witnesses, including his clergyman. Why
shouldn't the victim make a statement? Why can't a father hold a picture of his
dead child to show that this child existed and now will never graduate from high
school and will never get married?"
Id. at 631 (quoting activist John Walsh); see also Kyl & Feinstein, supra, at 82 ("mhe presence
of victims' families could inflame the jury, making it sympathetic to the prosecution. Yet no one
argues that defendants' families should be kept out of court.").
In response to this criticism, many states have passed victims' rights amendments to their
constitutions. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28; COLO. CONST.
art. II, § 16a; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 16; ILL. CONST. art 1, § 8.1; KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 15;
MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 24; Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 32; N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 22; N.M. CONST.
art. 2, § 24; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 30; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 345;
WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 9m; see also Albrecht, supra note 138, at 34 n.1 (listing 14 states which
had adopted such amendment as of 1995); cf. 1996 S.C. Acts 469 (proposing a victims' rights
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on trial to deflect criticism from the defendant's actions t40 Defense attorneys
also often use the victim's mistakes to their client's advantage. 1
41
Victims and their families also experience other kinds of emotional
distress as a result of the media and the judicial system. In many murder
cases, the victim's family is forced to watch the defense attorney demonize the
murdered victim. 142 In rape cases, the victim's social and sexual history are
often explored at length in news reports and in defense efforts to establish
consent.1 43 Additionally, for many years judges contributed to the demoral-
ization of rape victims by giving "Hale" instructions, which cautioned that
rape "'is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder
constitutional amendment); Larry Yackle, No: The Costs Would Be Too High, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1996, at 83, 83 (discussing negative implications of a proposed victims' rights amendment to the
United States Constitution). These constitutional amendments and victims' rights statutes often
state that victims have the right to present victim impact testimony to the court at sentencing. See
Albrecht, supra note 138, at 33. However, many judges and prosecutors oppose and therefore
limit victim impact statements. Id.; Clark, supra note 137, at 630.
140. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS 107 (1995) ("In one way or another, defense counsel puts [the victims] on trial. The
blame shifts from one side of the courtroom to the other."); Bosco, supra note 96, at 146
(statement of Margaret DiCanio, author of THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF VIOLENCE) ("'Trying the
victims as the guilty ones has become very common .... .'"); cf. Joe Saltzman, Who's the Real
Victim?: Television Coverage of Violent Crime, USA TODAY MAG., July 1994, at 49, 49
("Slowly, the original victim is forgotten and the accused-a human being crying out to be
understood-becomes a more sympathetic victim trying to set things right.").
141. The term "mistakes" must be interpreted broadly enough to include any behavior
that deflects criticism away from the defendant and toward the victim-even legal and socially
acceptable actions. See Margaret Carlson, The Victim, You Say?, TIME, July 4, 1994, at 27, 27
(noting that some would sympathize with O.J. Simpson as a result of publicity that murder victim
Nicole Brown Simpson entertained her boyfriend in a living room paid for by Simpson).
142. Sometimes the revictimization through the exclusion of murder victims' families from
trial is even more difficult to bear. See supra note 139.
The news media often utilize the same tactics as the defense; they pry into murder
victims' backgrounds, exposing their foibles and mistakes. See Bosco, supra note 96, at 146
("The media has reported every last scrap of gossip [in the O.J. Simpson case], all too often
invading the rightful privacy that should be given to murdered Nicole and Ron."); cf. Carlson,
supra note 141, at 27 (decrying the trend in the media to cast Nicole as "the bitch who ate
Brentwood and asked for everything she got" while empathizing with O.J. as being "only
human").
143. See, e.g., THALER, supra note 1, at 45 (discussingaccounts of alleged William Kennedy
Smith rape victim Patricia Bowman's "'little wild streak'"); Helen Benedict, Panel Discussion,
61 FORDHAM L. REv. 1141, 1141 (1993) ("At the moment, the accepted practice is for the media
to investigate the life and personality of any woman who is the victim of a notorious sex
crime."); Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 277, 281 (1993)
(noting the attitude that "[wlomen who appear to be sexually available were not really raped,
because they must have said 'yes'"). See generally, FLETCHER, supra note 140, at 108-13
(discussing how the defense strategy of blaming the victim, now popular in many criminal trials,
probably was used first in rape cases).
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to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.'"""4 Indeed, in
any trial where the victim's credibility is important, the victim can expect a
searing cross-examination from the defense attorney, whose job includes the
task of raising a reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds. Because such defense
tactics are sometimes effective and because the investigation and prosecution
of crimes do not always identify the correct defendant or collect enough
evidence for a conviction, the criminal justice system does not guarantee crime
victims that their transgressors will be brought to justice. 4 ' However, even
if the defendant is convicted, the judicial system can still punish crime
victims. 1
46
The tremendous invasions of privacy that crime victims and their
families suffer are especially difficult to bear. 47 Information that would be
considered personal and private for anyone other than a crime victim is often
included in news reports about trials. 48  As a result, communities often
144. Coombs, supra note 143, at 282 & n.17 (quoting State v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547, 554
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 636 (1680))); see also Linda
Fairstein, Panel Discussion, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 1137, 1137 (1993) (discussing ramifications
of antiquated"Hale instructions" which invoked the rigorous three-partcorroboration requirement
necessaryto support a rape victim's testimony); cf. FLETCHER, supra note 140, at 109 (discussing
evidence scholar John Wigmore's statements that "'errant young girls and women' suffered from
'multifarious' 'psychic complexes' that resulted in their 'contriving false charges of sexual
offenses by men'").
145. See, e.g., Fairstein, supra note 144, at 1137 ("[I]n 1971, although more than 2000 rapes
were reported to the New York City police, only eighteen men were convicted of crimes of
sexual assault. . . ."); Viano, supra note 105, at 52 n.27 ("For example, only 42 (4.8 %) of the
881 cases reported to police in Marion County, Indiana in 1970, 1973, and 1975 resulted in a
convicted offender being sent to prison.").
146. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 137, at 627 (discussing a two-year period of appeals that
left a family feeling "like victims of the judicial system"); id. at 627-28 (noting how "an appeal
by a rapist 15 years after his conviction required his victims to repeat their age-old testimony and,
in some cases, discuss the rape with their spouses and children for the first time"); cf. Daniel E.
Lungren, Victims and the Exclusionary Rule, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 695, 695-96 (1996)
(noting a victim's comparison of the appellate process to a "'chess game'").
147. Society pays a price for the loss of privacy inherent in the criminal justice system
because fear about potential loss of privacy is among the most frequently stated reasons given by
victims for not reporting crimes to law enforcement officials. Cf. Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610 (1982) ("Surely it cannot be suggested that minor victims of
sex crimes are the only crime victims who, because of publicity attendant to criminal trials, are
reluctant to come forward and testify."); Viano, supra note 105, at 63 ("[A] quick cost-benefit
analysis may show the victim that it is quite prudent and rational to decide not to report."); id.
at 63-64 ("The safety of the community requires that crimes be reported and that criminals be
stopped. This can be done only with the cooperation of the victims."); Suzanne M. Leone, Note,
Protecting Rape Victims' Identities: Balance Between the Right to Privacy and the First
Amendment, 27 NEw ENG. L. REv. 883, 910-11 (1993) (discussing reasons rape victims desire
privacy).
148. Although the disclosure of rape victims' names by reporters is still controversial, see
Viano, supra note 105, at 49 & n. 17, it is now allowed if "lawfully obtained from the public
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stigmatize and ostracize victims."' In addition, publicity about a crime
increases the victim's fear that the perpetrator will retaliate against the victim
for reporting the crime or otherwise attack again. 5 ' Televising trials only
adds to the invasion of privacy and its resultant problems by increasing the
size of the audience that becomes privy to otherwise private information and
by providing visual images from the courtroom that give the disclosed
information greater dramatic effect. 5 '
record," see Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 608 n.23. However, by disclosing the name of
a rape victim, a reporter can change the life of the victim dramatically. See Leone, supra
note 147, at 910-11 ("Each victim has a unique healing process and the public disclosure of her
identity could disrupt that process before the victim is ready.").
Often reporters do not stop at merely reporting the names of victims.
[Tihe media assumes that, by digging into the victim's past and personality, it
will uncover something about the crime, just as it might when it digs into the
accused's past and personality. Every profile of a victim, every account of
what that victim does or has done, is by implication, an assumption of the
victim's complicity in the crime: the very act of profiling the victim treats her
as if she is guilty until proven innocent.
Benedict, supra note 143, at 1143; see also Viano, supra note 105, at 44-45 ("The media may
often describe victims selectively and negatively. . . ."). At times, the persistence of reporters
only adds to the anguish of crime victims. Cf. News Media Can Be Tough on Crime Victims, CQ
RESEARCHER, July 22, 1994, at 638, 638 (describing two examples of over-zealous reporting).
149. See Benedict, supra note 143, at 1144-45; Deborah W. Denno, Perspectives on
Disclosing Rape Victims' Names, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 1113, 1125 (1993); Fairstein, supra
note 144, at 1138; Viano, supra note 105, at 50-51, 60-61. Sometimes ostracization results not
from an evil intent, but from people's discomfort and uncertainty about how to relate to crime
victims. See Clark, supra note 137, at 628, 642.
150. See Kathryn W. Hughes, Note, Florida Star v. B.J.F.: Can the State Regulate the Press
in the Interest of Protecting the Privacy of Rape Victims?, 41 MERCER L. REV. 1061, 1062
(1990) (noting how publicity caused a victim to seek police protection).
151. The humiliation of parading an alleged rape victim's undergar-
ments in a courtroom as occurred in the William Kennedy Smith
trial is a necessary part of the judicial process. Further humilia-
tion by making such evidence the fare of national television may
make for fair commercial television, but does it make for a fair
trial?
Lassiter, supra note 2, at 999; see also Viano, supra note 105, at 43 ("When it comes to
newsworthiness, there are some marked differencesbetween television and print news. Since most
cities have more television stations than newspapers competing against each other, the pressures
on television news organizations are more intense than those on newspapers."); Gardner, supra
note 19, at 490 (noting that "television is a more pervasive medium than newsprint" and that "the
televising of a trial would provide for more widespread public exposure than a newspaper
description"); Lacayo, supra note 10, at 31 ("For the accuser, the bitterest part of a rape trial
is the experience of having her personal life spread before the court, and usually torn apart by
the defense. Gavel-to-gavel coverage only magnifies the misery .... "); Saltzman, supra
note 140, at 49 ("Television magnifies the process by extending it to a mass electronic
audience .... Television ... has the power to turn almost any crime into [a] kind of public
spectacle."). For an analysis of cameras in the courtroom from the perspective of victims, see
32
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss1/3
1997] CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM
B. Victims' Monetary Losses
The psychological damage from the crime and the subsequent
investigation, trial, and publicity are not the only losses suffered by crime
victims. Over two-thirds of crime victims suffer direct economic losses,1
52
including lost wages' and medical expenses. Because lower income
persons are disproportionately the victims of crime,' 54 the fact that crime
victims often have inadequate insurance to pay for medical expenses is not
surprising.155 The economic losses suffered by crime victims can be substan-
tial. One study estimated that "a shotgun assault victim may... bear up to
$5 million in lost income and medical expenses over a thirty-five-year working
life . . . .156
In addition to purely economic losses, crime victims endure pain and
suffering, emotional distress, and other hardships.5 7 By including projected
costs of pain and suffering, one commentator quantified in 1985 the total cost
of crime to the average rape victim as over $50,000, to the average robbery
victim as approximately $12,500, and to the average assault victim as over
$12,000.15 Although tort victims who sue as plaintiffs in the civil justice
system regularly recover these losses in damages, crime victims are rarely
compensated for them. Crime victims theoretically can sue perpetrators for
damages, 15  but perpetrators rarely have the assets to pay a significant
Eisenbeiss, supra note 138.
152. See Albrecht, supra note 138, at 30 (noting that "71 percent of all victims of personal
crimes experience some economic loss").
153. In addition to the time that victims miss work for physical or emotional recovery, they
often must spend additional time to assist in the investigation and aptiear at trial. As a result,
some victims have even lost their jobs. See id. at 32-33 (describing legislative efforts to protect
crime victims from employment discipline or discharge due to participation in criminal
proceedings).
154. See AMERICAN VIOLENCE & PUBLIC POLICY 29-30 (Lynn A. Curtis ed., 1985). Urban
citizens and members of minorities are also disproportionately affected by crime. See Jeremy
Rabkin, Sue the Government, NEw REPUBLIC, May 8, 1995, at 16, 16, 18.
155. See Albrecht, supra note 138, at 30 ("In 1992, 617,460 people were victims of violent
crimes. Of these, 31.3 percent had no health insurance or were not eligible for public medical
services.") (footnote omitted).
156. Rabkin, supra note 154, at 19.
157. See Mark A. Cohen, A Note on the Cost of Crime to Victims, 27 URB. STUD. 139, 140
(1990); supra notes 142-51 and accompanying text; cf. Frank, supra note 139, at 114 (stating that
"monetary restitution cannot heal the emotional or physical scars inflicted by the offender").
158. Cohen, supra note 157, at 141.
159. See George P. Fletcher, What Is Punishment Imposed For?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 101, 103 (1944) ("It is hard to imagine a criminal injury to a person ... that would not
also be compensable in tort."); see also JUDGE JAMES E. MORRIS, VICTIM AFTER-SHOCK: How
TO GET RESULTS FROM THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 35 (1983) ("A civil action filed against
a person by his or her victim has always been an available remedy, though rarely used until
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judgment."6 Insurance is unavailable for satisfaction of judgments against
criminals because insurance for criminal acts is generally considered contrary
to public policy.16' Given the significant costs of litigation, securing an
uncollectible civil judgment against a criminal defendant would be a rather
Pyrrhic victory. Therefore, very few crime victims file civil suits. 62
The contrast between crime victims and tort plaintiffs in terms of
achieving meaningful recoveries is stunning-and difficult to defend.'63 An
individual who is paralyzed by a defective product or by medical malpractice
may recover millions in damages."6 In contrast, an individual who is
paralyzed by the stray bullet" of a drive-by shooter or the well-directed
recently.").
160. JAMES H. STARK & HOWARD W. GOLDSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS 192-93
(1985); cf. Fletcher, supra note 159, at 103 (noting that "in some situations the offender is
judgment-proof").
161. See 6B JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 4252, at 4-5 (Richard B. Buckley ed., 1979).
162. See Tony Mauro & Mark Potok, Double Trials an Unusual Event, USA TODAY, Jan.
28, 1997, at 3A.
163. For one attempt at a defense of the general distinctions between crime victims and tort
plaintiffs, see Gail L. Heriot, The Practical Role of Harm in the Criminal Law and the Law of
Tort, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145 (1994).
Additionally, two commentators used the following syllogism to describe the
simultaneous elevation and diminishment of crime victims:
Civil courts have not been a meaningful avenue of recovery for the vast majority
of crime victims; therefore:
It is more practical to handle their claims to restitution as part of the criminal
prosecution; but:
Where it is inconvenient for the criminal courts to handle restitution, it should
be left to the civil courts; however:
Civil courts have not been a meaningful avenue of recovery for the vast majority
of crime victims; therefore:
The claims of crime victims that cannot be handled conveniently within existing
criminal procedures are unlikely to be met at all.
Frank, supra note 139, at 112-13.
164. Multi-million dollar tort verdicts are not uncommon in products liability and medical
malpractice cases. See, e.g., $17,767,000 Verdict-Products Liability, NAT'L JURY VERDICT
REv. & ANALYSIS, Apr. 1996, at 2; $6,021,474 Verdict-Medical Malpractice, NAT'L JURY
VERDICT REv. & ANALYSIS, Sept. 1995, at 5; $12,688,492 Gross Verdict-Products Liability,
NAT'L JURY VERDICT REV. & ANALYSIS, Jan. 1995, at 2; $9,600,000 Verdict-Products
Liability, NAT'L JURY VERDICT REV. & ANALYSIS, July 1994, at 3; $3,210,000 Verdict-Medical
Malpractice, NAT'L JURY VERDICT REV. & ANALYSIS, Nov. 1993, at 10; $8,900,000
Verdict-Medical Malpractice, NAT'L JURY VERDICT REV. & ANALYSIS, Mar. 1993, at 5; cf.
Janet Novack, Torture by Tort, FORBES, Nov. 6, 1995, at 138, 141 ("A conservative estimate
from management and actuarial consultant TillinghastTowers Perrin puts the cost of the nation's
tort system at $150 billion in 1994, over 2% of gross domestic product."). Even settlements can
generate seven figure recoveries. See $1,300,000 Recovery, NAT'L JURY VERDICT REV. &
ANALYSIS, Jan. 1995, at 18.
165. Although gunshot victims generally recover minimal-if any-damages, significant
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bullet of a known gunman will usually recover nothing."6 This disparate
treatment is rendered even more indefensible if the plaintiff in a civil suit is
a prisoner who was incarcerated for harming an uncompensated victim. 67
C. The Criminal Justice System's Attempts at Victim Compensation
Two structures have been incorporated into the criminal justice system
to try to compensate crime victims for their losses. These systems are
restitution and victim compensation programs. While these systems are
somewhat helpful, both are underfinanced168 and therefore only partially
effective.
1. Restitution
Restitution, which requires convicted defendants to compensate their
victims as part of the sentence, 69 embodies the older system. In fact,
restitution has existed for thousands of years in several cultures. 170 Despite
its longevity, restitution awards were relatively rare in the United States until
judgments have been rendered in favor of victims struck by stray bullets fired from police
officer's guns. E.g., $7,752,500 Verdict Including $1 Million PunitiveAward-Alleged Excessive
Use of Police Force, NAT'L JURY VERDICT REV. & ANALYSIS, Dec. 1994, at 2.
166. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text. Comparing the treatment of crime
victims to the treatment of victims of natural disasters is also interesting.
Victims of violent crime are as deserving of our compassion and aid as are any
victims of a catastrophe, natural or man-made. It would never occur to us to ask
if the victims of a natural disaster have earned emergency and restitutive aid.
Every citizen has that right. I believe that violent crime victims are disaster
victims and have a right to a special status. Social justice requires that society
take responsibility for making the victim whole again.
Frank, supra*note 139, at 115 (quoting ROBERT REIFF, THE INVISIBLE VICTIM 15-16 (1979)).
167. See Lungren, supra note 145, at 701 (condemning a system that allows "those who are
imprisoned [to be] the victims as opposed to the perpetrators").
168. See infra text accompanying notes 177-83, 199-201.
169. For discussions of the importance of restitution in the criminal justice system, see
Fletcher, supra note 159, at 102-03; Frank, supra note 139, at 113-15; Kersh, supra note 137,
at 346-49; Fred Gay & Thomas J. Quinn, Restorative Justice and Prosecution in the Twenty-First
Century, PROSECUTOR, Sept.-Oct., 1996, at 16. Compare Robert E. Crew, Jr. & Mary Vancore,
Managing Victim Restitution in Florida: An Analysis of the Implementation of FS 775.089, 17
JUST. Sys. J. 241, 241 (1994), which notes motivating factors for implementing Florida's plan.
170. See STARK & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 160, at 150; Frank, supra note 139, at 109-12;
Kersh, supra note 137, at 346; Clark, supra note 137, at 633; Gay & Quinn, supra note 169,
at 16; Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Restitution in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 77 JUDICATURE
90, 90 (1993). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, several states had even adopted
legislation requiring the state to compensate crime victims when it failed in its obligation to
protect its citizenry. See Rabkin, supra note 154, at 16, 18.
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recent changes in legislative and judicial attitudes. Through the 1930s, courts
in less than a dozen states were specifically allowed to order restitution in
criminal cases.17 1 By 1988, though, more than twenty states had adopted
legislation mandating restitution orders in every case with documented
economic losses. " All fifty states have now enacted some type of restitution
statute. 1
73
"[M]ost states limit restitution to . . . 'actual' or pecuniary loss-
es . ."17' With very few exceptions, 175 states generally do not allow
victims to recover for "inconvenience, pain and suffering, or... physical
impairment. "176
Even though the restitution awards are substantially less than the
damages awarded in civil cases, collecting restitution payments often has
proven to be unsuccessful.'" Although exact data is probably impossible to
gather, a safe estimate is that substantially less than half of the amounts
awarded in restitution will ever be collected by victims. 7' Many criminal
defendants simply do not have the assets or income necessary to pay full
restitution. 179 Although some states have adopted innovative programs to try
171. Frank, supra note 139, at 111.
172. Id. at 111 & n.20; see also Clark, supra note 137, at 639 (stating the total number of
states requiring restitution for "non-property crimes" was 21 in 1994).
173. See Frank, supra note 139, at 111-12. For discussions of restitution in federal criminal
cases, see Tobolowsky, supra note 169; Kersh, supra note 137, at 345, 348-49.
174. STARK & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 160, at 154; see also Frank, supra note 139,
at 127-28 (discussing how "[m]ost agencies responsible for determining restitution" focus on
easily quantifiable medical costs, funeral and burial expenses, and property damage).
175. STARK & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 160, at 154 (noting that Washington allows awards
for pain and suffering and that North Carolina "authorize[s] restitution for all damages or losses
that could ordinarily be recovered by the victim in a civil action").
176. See id.
177. See ADMINISTRATvE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, BRINGING CRIMINAL DEBT INTO
BALANCE: IMPROVING FINE & RESTITUTION COLLECTION 5 (1992) ("Financial penalties-fines
or restitution-are an important part of criminal sanctions, but such obligations often remain
unpaid."); Frank, supra note 139, at 108 ("One vital service to victims that is often overlooked
by probation and parole professionals, the community, and crime victims, is the collection of
restitution."); Robert C. Davis & Tanya M. Bannister, Improving Collection of Court-Ordered
Restitution, 79 JUDICATURE 30, 30 (1995) ("[S]ome offenders were removed from probation
without ever making restitution.").
178. See Crew & Vancore, supra note 169, at 244 (stating that in fiscal year 1991-1992
Florida courts ordered over $30 million in restitution, but only about $11.5 million was
collected); Davis & Bannister, supra note 177, at 30 ("A recent study by the American Bar
Association found that nonpayment rates ranged from 38 to 67 percent at four sites where access
to restitution records was available. Similarly, Davis and Lurigio report a collection rate of only
34 percent for a probation-run collection program in Cook County, Illinois.") (footnote omitted).
179. E.g., STARK & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 160, at 149-50 ("New York officials estimate
that between 20 and 25 percent of criminals convicted in the New York courts have sufficient
assets to pay restitution to some of their victims . . ").
(Vol. 49: 1
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to increase collection of criminal debt, including restitution,' s° such debts
probably will never be fully recoverable."' Thus, restitution is a prom-
ised,'1 but largely unrealized, means of recovery for crime victims. 83
2. Victim Compensation Programs
The Federal Victims of Crime Act of 1984'1 (VOCA) led to the
creation of state crime victim compensation programs."8 Under this statute,
the federal government reimburses each state with a qualifying VOCA
program for forty percent of the amount the state spent in the previous year
for victim compensation. 8 6 Every state now has a victim compensation
program. i87
180. Frank, supra note 139, at 121-22; Patricia G. Barnes, Making Criminals Pay, A.B.A.
J., June 1996, at 20.
181. Even in the federal system, where U.S. Attorney's offices are staffed with debt
collectors who regularly attempt to collect criminal debts, uncollected criminal debt has
skyrocketed. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, supra note 177, at 7, 19; cf. NANCY
L. RIDER & FRANKLIN T. SHIPPEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTOR'S GUIDE TO CRIMINAL
FINES AND RESTITUTION 42-43 (1992) (suggesting methods to improve fine collection).
182. Some crime victims possess no illusion of recovery from restitution. Because restitution
is ordered as a part of sentencing, it can be awarded only when the perpetrator is identified and
convicted. As a result, only a small percentage of those who become crime victims can hope to
recover through restitution. See, for example, Frank, supra note 139, at 114, noting that:
John Heinz, a proponent of victims' rights, explained that "[s]ince less than
20% of all crimes lead to an arrest, less than 10% of the accused are ever
prosecuted, and less than three per cent of those arrested are actually convicted,
97% of all victims would go unaided if restitution were their only means of
assistance or retribution."
183. STARK & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 160, at 149 ("[A]n order of restitution is meaningless
unless the convicted offender has the means to pay restitution and the court or some other state
agency enforces the restitution order."). In addition to the obvious negative impact on crime
victims, promising restitution without actually collecting it does not increase the public's
confidence in the criminal justice system. See Davis & Bannister, supra note 177, at 30; cf.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, supra note 177, at 5 ("Imagine the outrage if those
responsible for an escaped prisoner's capture sat idly by and made no attempt to locate the
fugitive. The reaction should be similar for unpaid fines and restitution orders.").
184. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-10605 (1994). This Act was spearheaded by Senators Strom
Thurmond of South Carolina and Joseph R. Biden, Jr. of Delaware. Clark, supra note 137, at
634.
185. Desmond S. Greer, A Transatlantic Perspective on the Compensation of Crime Victims
in the United States, 85 J. CRI. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 333,393-94 (1994); Clark, supra note 137,
at 634; Henry J. Reske, Constitutional Cooperation, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 26, 26.
186. See Alex Daniels, Realigning Victims' Rights, GOVERNING, Dec. 1995, at 43, 45. The
federal funds are from a Crime Victims' Fund that receives federal criminal fines, special penalty
assessments, and forfeited appearance fees. Greer, supra note 185, at 394-95.
187. Clark, supra note 137, at 627; Daniels, supra note 186, at 43. The Districtof Columbia
and the Virgin Islands also have victim compensationprograms, but Puerto Rico does not. Greer,
1997]
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States have relatively wide discretion in setting up victim compensation
programs.1 18 Nonetheless, the programs share substantial similarities. For
example, only victims of violent crime are eligible to participate.'89 Most
states further limit eligibility to innocent victims who were not engaging in
illegal activity at the time of the crime, victims who filed reports of the crime
to law enforcement officials within five days and thereafter fully cooperated
with these officials, and victims of crimes that caused physical injury,
emotional trauma, or death."9
Compensable expenses vary somewhat from state to state, but are
almost universally more limited than those awarded in restitution. Victim
compensation programs usually cover only out-of-pocket expenses incurred as
a direct result of crimes, including medical bills, counseling fees, 9' funeral
expenses, and lost wages."9 Losses that can be recovered from insurance or
other collateral sources are not recoverable from victim compensation
programs."9 Except in a few states, 9' property losses are not cov-
ered."9 Additionally, victims generally cannot recover for cash and other
items stolen in robberies"9 or for pain and suffering."'
The maximum amount recoverable from the victim compensation
programs varies from state to state, 198 but these maximums are rarely
reached. The average recovery from victim compensation programs is only
$2,000.1'9 Despite the relatively modest sums recovered by crime victims,
supra note 185, at 334 n.8. Nevada is the only state that has a program that does not qualify for
VOCA reimbursement. See id.
188. The requirements for federal reimbursement are set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)
(1994).
189. Greer, supra note 185, at 340-43. "Victims" eligible to participate invariably include
relatives of persons who have died after a crime of violence. Id. at 353-57.
190. Frank, supra note 139, at 116-18.
191. Greer, supra note 185, at 354, 372-73.
192. Clark, supra note 137, at 634.
193. Greer, supra note 185, at 373; Clark, supra note 137, at 634.
194. For a discussionof assorted state provisions allowing limited recovery for some property
damage or losses, see Greer, supra note 185, at 357-59.
195. Id. at 357; cf Frank, supra note 139, at 118 & n.50 (stating the general principle that
"[n]one of the ... programs provide reimbursement for damages to, or the loss of, personal
property," but noting limited exceptions).
196. See Clark, supra note 137, at 634. In some states, recovery is allowed for eyeglasses,
prosthetic devices, hearing aids, and dentures that were lost or damaged as a result of crimes.
Frank, supra note 139, at 118 n.50; Greer, supra note 185, at 357.
197. Frank, supra note 139, at 118; Greer, supra note 185, at 373-74. The exclusionofpain
and suffering usually results from a desire to reduce costs. See id. at 374.
198. Greer, supra note 185, at 375 (containing a chart showing varying ranges of maximum
compensation among states); Clark, supra note 137, at 634 (noting that maximums generally
range from $10,000 to $25,000); id. at 637 (containing a map showing maximum compensation
by state).
199. See Daniels, supra note 186, at 45; cf. Greer, supra note 185, at 376-77 ("To a British
[Vol. 49:1
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many state compensation programs continually face financial stress that causes
delay or reduction in benefit payments. 2 ° Due to a combination of insuffi-
cient funds and failures by victims to file claims, less than ten percent of those
injured or killed by criminals obtain compensation. 1 Viewed from a
different perspective, the compensation system paid only $2.3 million in 1992
even though the direct economic cost of crime (excluding pain and suffering
and other noneconomic losses) was estimated at over $1.3 billion.'
Even acting in combination, the restitution and victim compensation
systems fall well short of providing crime victims adequate recovery for their
losses. This failure largely results from a lack of financial resources.
IV. THE BROADCAST-FEES-FOR-CRIME-VICTIMS PROPOSAL
Televised trials present one possible source of this much needed revenue
for underfimanced restitution and victim compensation systems. Although
charging fees for the right to televise trials will not, in and of itself, complete-
ly solve the problem of undercompensated crime victims, it is an overdue step
in the right direction.
observer, [even the American] maxima might seem comparatively low-the British Board has
made awards in excess of $750,000.").
200. Awards under many programs are also subject to the
availability of funds, thereby limiting the victim's 'right' to
compensation.. . . Boards are frequently authorized to 'prorate'
awards or to make "appropriate proportionate reductions" if they
find or anticipate that sufficient funds are not available.
... Occasionally there is a complete embargo where "no
further awards ... shall be made until sufficient funds are
available." In recent years, many programs have availed
themselves of such provisions and suspended or reduced awards
otherwise payable to victims.
Greer, supra note 185, at 377-78 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 396 (noting that "'[e]ighteen
[state] programs said [financial] resourceswere inadequateto pay deserving claim[ants]'"); Clark,
supra note 137, at 631, 633 (statement of Dan Eddy, executive director of the National
Association of Crime Victim Compensation Boards) ("State victim compensation funds. . . 'are
facing financial pressure and some are delaying payments'... . 'I don't know of one that's not
either facing a problem or nervous about the future ... .'"); Daniels, supra note 186, at 45
("Even at those relatively low levels of recompense, the programs are finding it difficult to keep
up with demands on their services and money.... Some states are two years behind in awarding
compensation.").
201. Greer, supra note 185, at 396-97.
202. Id. at 397 & n.328.
1997]
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A. Overview of the Proposal
Although a few courts have asked broadcasters to pay electric bills or
other costs that directly result from televising trials, 3 courts do not current-
ly charge fees for the right to broadcast criminal trials. In an age when
governments are continuously and sometimes somewhat desperately seeking
sources of revenue outside general taxes, the states' failure to charge fees for
broadcasting rights perpetuates this corporate welfare program. Given the
substantial value of broadcasting rights, as documented by the significant
revenue generated by those who televise trials,2' this government "gift" is
rather remarkable.
This largess stands in marked contrast to widespread government fee
collection in other areas. Examples of fees charged by governments include the
following: users' fees charged for a wide variety of government services,
including access to parks,' 5 the right to participate in public school system
extracurricular activities,' the right to dump solid waste, 7 the use of
government-produced electrical power,' °s connections to water and sewer
lines,' special assessments charged to property owners for infrastructure
development, 10 and airport development "head taxes" collected from
203. California's newly revised cameras in the courtroom rule provides, "The judge may
condition the order permitting media coverage on the media agency's agreement to pay any
increased court-incurred costs resulting from the permitted media coverage (for example, for
additional court security or utility service)." CAL. R. 980(e)(4). Prior to this change in the
California law, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors proposed asking broadcasters to
reimburse the county for expenses incurred during the O.J. Simpson trial. See Carla Rivera,
County May Ask Media to Help Shoulder Costs, L.A. TiMEs, Feb. 28, 1995, at A13.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 119-25; see also Gospill & Molander, supra note 11,
at 12 ("If the stakes are high, and the ratings are there, the courts could charge a hefty fee-and
get away with it.").
205. See Randal O'Toole, Fund National Parks Out of User Fees, ENVTL. FORUM, July/Aug.
1996, at 37; Ralph Regula, The Public Must be a Partner in National Parks, ENVTL. FORUM,
July/Aug. 1996, at 38, 39 (discussing recreation fees in National Parks).
206. David G. Challed, Student Fee Waivers in Public Schools: Have Fees Created a Private
School Within a Public School?, CLEARINGHOUSE REv., June 1996, at 121, 121 (stating that "in
approximately 34 states ... some type of student fees are [sic] assessed or charged against
children to attend school").
207. Steve Yarbrough, Casenote, Compensatory Fee or Protectionist Tax: Oregon's
Surcharge on Out-of-State Waste, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 497, 498-99 (1994).
208. See Matthew C. Cordaro, What's in Store for Public Power?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July
1, 1995, at 14; Randall Hardy, Should the United States Privatize the Power Marketing Agencies
(PMAs)?: Can We Learn Lessons from the United Kingdom?, PuB. UTIL. FORT., June 1, 1995,
at 38.
209. Charles C. Mulcahy & Michelle J. Zimet, Impact Fees for a Developing Wisconsin, 79
MARQ. L. REv. 759, 760 (1996).
210. Joe McDaniel, Jr., You Get What You Pay for: Using Special Assessments to Finance
Infrastructure, 14 GLENDALE L. REv. 1, 3 (1995).
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passengers.21
Governments are especially likely to collect fees from businesses
that stand to profit from goods, services, or rights bestowed upon them by
government agencies. For instance, state and local governments generate
substantial revenue through the sale of liquor licenses. 212 Municipalities
require payments from land developers. 23 Governments collect fees from
those who use government property, including ranchers who graze their
livestock on public lands214 and oil and gas developers who lease the mineral
interests on these lands.2"' The National Park Service charges fees to
concessionaires who operate businesses in national parks.21 6 The FCC
recently began auctioning licenses for portions of the radio spectrum.217
Cities demand large franchise fees from cable television operators.2 5 Courts
require litigants to pay filing fees219 and charge reporters fees for copying
211. Suzanne lmes, Comment, Airline Passenger Facility Charges: What Do They Mean for
an Ailing Industry?, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 1039, 1041 (1995).
212. See generally Shelley Ross Saxer, License to Sell: Constitutional Protection Against
State or Local Government Regulation of Liquor Licensing, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441,449-
50 (1995) (discussing the power of state and local governments to issue liquor licenses).
213. Exactions are fees, rights, or restrictions demanded by local governments from
developers to offset the costs of constructing new capital facilities. See Mulcahy & Zimet, supra
note 209, at 760-61. Exactions include mandatory dedications of land for schools or parks (or
fees in lieu of such dedications), impact fees, and special assessments. Id. at 760.
214. Joseph M. Feller, 'Til the Cows Come Home: The Fatal Flaw in the Clinton Administra-
tion's Public Lands Grazing Policy, 25 ENVTL. L. 703, 709 (1995).
215. See generally Alan S. Miller, Energy Policy from Nixon to Clinton: From Grand
Provider to Market Facilitator, 25 ENVTL. L. 715, 719 n.38 (1995) (indicating opposition to the
expansion of oil and gas leasing on public lands from Congress and the courts).
216. Dennis J. Herman, Loving Them to Death: Legal Controls on the Type and Scale of
Development in the National Parks, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 45 (1992); George T. Frampton,
Jr., The Public Wants a Protected, Funded System, ENVTL. FORUM, July-Aug. 1996, at 36, 37.
217. Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative
Action at the FCC IncreasedAuction Competition, 48 STAN. L. RaV. 761,762 (1996); Ruth W.
Pritchard-Kelly, Comment, A Comparison Between Spectrum Auctions in the United States and
New Zealand, 20 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 155, 155 (1996); Stephen Maloney, Auctioning
Access to Regulated Markets, PUB. UTiL. FORT., Mar. 15, 1996, at 18, 19.
218. See Kent D. Wakeford, Municipal Cable Franchising: An Unwarranted Intrusion into
Competitive Markets, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 233, 246-49 (1995). Although the basis for a city's
right to demand franchise fees from a cable television company is not readily apparent, the courts
have upheld this right. See id. at 234-35 (noting that the approval of municipal regulations of
cable television franchises largely stems from "three primary rationales: (1) cable franchises
continuously use and occupy public property; (2) 'laying cable' constitutes a public disruption
implicating a locality's police power to protect the safety, health and property of its citizens; and
(3) cable franchises are a 'natural monopoly'") (footnotes omitted).
219. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1911 (requiring litigants to pay Supreme Court filing fees); id.
§ 1913 (requiring litigants to pay courts of appeal filing fees); id. § 1914 (requiring litigants to
pay federal district court filing fees); N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-17-04 (1995 & Supp. 1997)
(requiring litigants to pay fees for the filing of complaints, answers, and other pleadings); id. §
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court records.' Under the leadership of the NCAA and CFA, state univer-
sities charge radio and television stations and networks large fees for the right
to broadcast their football games and other sporting events. 22'
Given the widespread government practice of collecting fees from
businesses and other citizens, now is the time for states to stop giving away
the right to broadcast criminal trials. If courts can charge litigants for the right
to use the court system, then they can charge networks for the right to
broadcast criminal trials.
If requiring broadcasters to pay for televising trials is accepted, then
procedures and policies need outlining. To maximize revenue from broadcast
rights fees, the two-step approach outlined more fully in the Appendix should
be used.' First, courts should set a standard "per day" fee for nonexclusive
rights to broadcast ordinary criminal proceedings. m The standard fee
amount should vary somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, depending in
part upon the television market's size. Broadcasters should be required to pay
the fee to the clerk of court before they are given access to the courtroom to
set up their equipment. 4
When particular criminal cases are important or notorious enough to
generate more than the standard fee, courts should follow the FCC's lead and
conduct sealed bid auctionse for exclusivel 6 rights to broadcast trials and
27-03-05 (Supp. 1997) (requiring litigants to pay North Dakota Supreme Court filing fees).
220. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18(2) (Supp. 1997) (providing for a reasonable
fee for the making of copies). Some federal courts have also adopted fees for providing access
to electronically stored court records. Lucy Dalglish, Judges Reverse Course on Cameras in
Federal Courts, QUILL, May 1995, at 16, 16; see also Los Angeles Times Sues County over
Electronic Record Fees, NEWS MEDIA & L.,Winter 1996, at 35, 35 [hereinafter Electronic
Record Fees] (describingthe County of Los Angeles's new program whereby companies contract
with the county to provide on-line access to court documents to the public and to private
companies).
221. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 92-95 (1984); see also David L.
Anderson, The Sports Broadcasting Act: Calling It What It Is-Special Interest Legislation, 17
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 945, 956 (1995) (discussing the Court's reasoning in NCAA).
222. The Appendix is based, in part, upon the courtroom rules from the state with perhaps
the most experience with televised trials, California. See CAL. R. 980.
Although the primary concern is televised trials, the model rule/statute in the Appendix
is written broadly enough to cover other camera and broadcast issues. In some cases, both radio
and television stations or networks may wish to broadcast trials.
The Appendix primarily addresses the collection and distribution of broadcast fees. Other
issues related to broadcasting of trials, such as restrictions on the number, location, and operation
of cameras and microphones, presumably would be covered by other court rules or orders.
223. See infra app. at 51.
224. See infra app. at 50-51.
225. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. The FCC uses sealed bid auctions as well
as other auction systems. William Kummel, Spectrum Bids, Bets, and Budgets: Seeking an
Optimal Allocation and Assignment Process forDomestic Commercial Electromagnetic Spectrum
[Vol. 49:1
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other proceedings. 7 Based on the FCC's experience in auctioning resources
that it previously gave away,"8 auctions for broadcasting rights to important
or notorious trials should generate substantial, perhaps even unexpectedly
high, revenues. 9 However, given the relatively few networks that televise
trials at length, lack of bidding competition is a potential problem. Therefore,
courts should establish a minimum bid when announcing sealed bid auc-
tions.uO
Fees collected from broadcasters should be maintained by the clerk of
court in a separate account for the crime victims involved." If the defendant
is convicted and restitution is ordered, the victims from that trial should be
allowed to collect the restitution ordered from this account. 2 The defen-
dant, however, should not be relieved of his obligation to pay restitution.
Instead, the defendant's restitution payments should be made to the applicable
victim compensation program. 3
Products, Services, and Technology, 48 FED. CoMM. L.J. 511, 528-38 (1996) (comparing the
merits of the different auction systems).
226. The network securing the exclusive right to broadcast a trial would also have the right
to resell this right or to sell other networks feeds of its images. See infra app. at 51.
227. Auctions are an economically efficient way to generate revenue and distribute scarce
government resources. See John Berresford, A Free Market in Spectrum: Closer Than You Think,
PUB. UnL. FORT., June 15, 1996, at 16 ("Contrary to the general impression, I believe this idea
[of auctioning all FCC radio rights] is neither radical nor impracticable. It is founded on the same
general principle that has worked elsewhere in our economy: Voluntary exchanges between
intelligent adults will produce the greatest good for society."); Maloney, supra note 217, at 20
("Two hundred years of auctions demonstrate the superiority of market solutions .... Auctions
have also proven most effective in serving the public interest.").
228. Ayres & Cramton, supra note 217, at 813; Kummel, supra note 225, at 512; Pritchard-
Kelly, supra note 217, at 155.
229. See Ayres & Cramton, supra note 217, at 762 (noting early FCC auctions raised nearly
$9 billion); Kummel, supra note 225, at 512 ("In less than two years, federal government
spectrum auctions have generated more than $20 billion in revenue through the sale of 2745
licenses, a remarkable amount considering that radio frequencies are a resource that were always
awarded without charge and still are for many users.") (footnote omitted); Pritchard-Kelly, supra
note 217, at 161 n.37 ("In 1992, the Office of Management and Budget projected $4.5 billion
in revenues from auctioning the PCS bands. In 1995, the industry estimates were nearing $12
billion.") (citation omitted); id. at 174 ("[B]idders were willing to pay money far in excess of
that anticipated by either the government or industry observers."); Maloney, supra note 217,
at 19 ("Spectrum auctions raised close to $7 billion in license fees alone in recent years.").
230. See infra app. at 51.
231. See infra app. at 52.
232. See id. The availability of broadcast fees as a source of restitution payments may
overcome judicial reluctance to order restitution when the defendant is indigent. Consequently,
restitution should become more common in televised cases with identifiable victims.
233. Payment of restitution into victim compensation programs is not unprecedented. See
Crew & Vancore, supra note 169, at 246 ("Faced with accumulations of [restitution] funds
that they cannot-for whatever reason-distribute to victims, most organizations seek guidance
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If the broadcast fees in the clerk of court's account for victims exceed
the amount necessary to fully satisfy the restitution order, the excess should
be paid to the victim compensation program for the benefit of other vic-
tims. 4 Similarly, if the defendant is acquitted and therefore no restitution
order is issued, all broadcasting fees collected for the trial should be forwarded
to the victim compensation program.235
Although victims have always had some interest in whether criminal
proceedings would be televised, 6 they traditionally have lacked a financial
stake in this decision. Under the broadcast-fees-for-crime-victims proposal,
victims would have a direct financial interest in this decision. Therefore,
victims should be given the right, along with the defendant and the prosecu-
tion, to advise the court of their position regarding whether a trial should be
televised and whether the court should conduct an auction for exclusive
broadcast rights."
If the fees generated through this proposed sale of broadcast rights are
sufficient, courts and victim compensation programs could expand restitution
and compensation awards to include recovery for pain and suffering and other
noneconomic damages that traditionally have been excluded. Even if this
expanded recovery is not possible, any amounts generated by broadcast fees
for victims would increase their current meager recoveries.
from the relevant court. The second ... alternative is to remit funds to the state Crime
CompensationFund."); cf. Frank, supranote 139, at 119 ("Staff workers at victim compensation
programs often point out that these programs are only 'fronting' the money which the offender
should ultimately have to pay back to the programs through restitution.").
234. See infra app. at 52.
235. If an acquittal results, the crime victim will not be entitled to restitution, but she may
be able to collect benefits from the victim compensation program. Eligibility requirements for
victim compensation programs do not require conviction or even identification of the perpetrator.
See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 142, 150 and accompanying text.
237. See infra app. at 51.
Even in the current system, some states permit victim input into the court's decision
concerning the allowance of cameras into the courtroom. MURPHY, supra note 10, at 38-39;
Frank, supra note 36, at 802 n.339; Lassiter, supra note 2, at 929 n.8. Many lawyers believe
the victims' views should be taken into account. See Day, supra note 68, at 51 (printing survey
results that reveal 62% of lawyers said victims' feelings should be given consideration and 38 %
said they should be controlling); Eisenbeiss, supra note 138, at 15.
In some states, the concerns of witnesses or other "participants," presumably including
victims who will serve as witnesses, are considered by judges contemplating televised trials.
MURPHY, supra note 10, at 153 (Connecticut); Frank, supra note 36, at 792, 802 & n.339
(noting 14 states require witness consent); Lassiter, supra note 2, at 929 n.8 (listing 13 states
requiring witness consent); Gardner, supra note 19, at 490, 495-97; cf. id. at 511 (proposing a
model guideline which would prohibit photographing, broadcasting, or telecasting of any "witness
who expresses to the judge any prior objection").
[Vol. 49:1
44
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss1/3
CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM
B. Rebuttal of Expected Criticism
The move to collect fees for broadcast rights cannot be made without
dissent. However, each of the anticipated criticisms of this system can be
rebutted.
1. Broadcast Fees Are Not Unfair to Broadcasters
Those who now televise trials without paying access fees will
undoubtedly complain that charging such fees is unfair. 8 Whenever the
government begins charging for a benefit that it previously distributed free of
charge, former beneficiaries of the windfall can be expected to protest.
However, the mere existence of a windfall should not be enough to justify its
continued existence-regardless of how long the windfall has operated.
Enactment of the broadcast-fees-for-crime-victims proposal will not
force networks or stations to broadcast trials. Those who choose not to televise
trials will never have to pay standard broadcast fees or bid for the right to
exclusive television coverage. For those who choose to continue to televise
trials, broadcast fees will reduce, but should not eliminate, the profitability of
televised trials. No economically rational network will bid or pay higher
broadcast fees than it can recover by televising a trial.
Without question, charging broadcast fees will raise the costs of
televising trials. 29 This economic disincentive is not necessarily a problem.
In some cases, network executives will decide not to broadcast trials because
of the extra cost associated with broadcast fees. Given the social costs and
problems associated with televised trials,2" some would argue that this
disincentive is an added benefit of broadcast fees.241
Broadcasters will suggest that any trials that are not televised due to
access fees are a loss to society because networks are performing a public
service whenever they televise trials. This argument ignores the real reason
that trials are televised: the generation of revenue for television networks
through entertainment programming.242 If public service is the concern,
238. See Rivera, supra note 203, at A13 ("The Radio and Television News Assn. responded
that it is 'adamantly opposed' to any effort to impose charges on the media."). Media agencies
already complain about the rather paltry fees that they have been charged for access to electronic
court information systems. See Dalglish, supra note 220, at 16; Electronic Record Fees, supra
note 220, at 35.
239. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 16-17 (discussing the minimal costs currently
associated with televising trials).
240. See supra notes 68, 150 and accompanying text.
241. See Day, supra note 68, at 20-21 (arguing that the cost of televising trials may provide
some "intrinsic value" by shielding trials from cameras).
242. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
19971
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courts could waive broadcast fees for television networks who are willing to
forego any revenue from broadcasting trials. 3
2. Broadcast Fees Are Not Unconstitutional
Television executives and their supporters might also suggest
that broadcast fees somehow infringe upon their constitutional right of access
to court proceedings. 2' However, this argument overstates the scope of the
right of access.245
In a series of relatively recent decisions, the Supreme Court repeatedly
has held that courts cannot adopt broad sweeping rules excluding the
public 6 from trials-although case-specific court closings are sometimes
243. See infra app. at 52. Other commentators suggest that trials would best be televised by
cable access or other similar local television stations. MURPHY, supra note 10, at 41 (proposing
televising of trials on local cable television); Harris, supra note 1, at 826-27 (proposing televising
local trials on "Community Court TV"); Sasaki, supra note 19, at 804-05 (discussing
uninterrupted gavel-to-gavel coverage on cable access channels); Dershowitz, supra note 104,
at 46 (proposing a "J-Span" channel with coverage similar to the congressional coverage on C-
Span).
244. See Rivera, supra note 203 (statement of Sylvia Teague, president of the Radio and
Television News Association) ("'We believe charging for trial coverage is a clear violation of the
news media's right to report on public trials' .... ").
245. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1965) (holding that the press's First
Amendment rights do not confer the right to use equipment in the courtroom and that the public's
right of access to courtrooms is satisfied by allowing reporters merely to attend proceedings);
United States v. Edwards, 785 F.2d 1293, 1295 (5th Cir. 1986) ("While these cases establish
that the press has a right of access to observe criminal trials .... the right of access therein was
a right to attend, listen and report. No case suggests that this right of access includes a right to
televise, record, or otherwise broadcast trials."); Westmoreland v. CBS, 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d
Cir. 1984) ("There is a long leap, however, between a public right under the First Amendment
to attend trials and a public right under the First Amendment to see a given trial televised.");
United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 1983) ("To conclude from these
cases . . . that the right of access extends to the right to televise, record, and broadcast trials,
misconceives the meaning of the right of access at stake in those cases."); ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 19, at 58 ("All of the cases to date' that have addressed the issue of whether electronic
media coverage falls within the right of access promulgated in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia
have concluded that it does not.") (footnote omitted); cf. Gerbner, supra note 9, at 417 (noting
that the issue is not whether reporters are free to report trials, but whether "the addition of video
spectacle to the already existing press and broadcast coverage would reduce or increase the risk
of prejudice" to defendants).
The right of access to trials is a right enjoyed by the public-not a right that only the
press itself possesses. Therefore, the media's argument that this right somehow gives it authority
to televise trials has interesting implications. Cf. Prentice, supra note 5, at 14 ("Would we allow
the public in a courtroom during a trial to make 'home videos' if they wished to do so? Imagine
spectators recording trial proceedings for home use or later broadcast by some interested cable
network program.").
246. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 598, 610-11 (1982) (holding
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allowed.247 Therefore, any rule prohibiting reporters (whether they are
representatives of television networks, newspapers, magazines, or other non-
broadcast media outlets) from attending and covering trials would be
unconstitutional.24
However, the broadcast-fees-for-crime-victims proposal does not close
trials or exclude reporters from courtrooms. Instead, it merely provides
that those who wish to televise trials must pay a fee for this privilege. Even
when exclusive broadcasting rights would be sold through silent auctions,
reporters from media outlets who did not secure the right to televise the trial
would be given the same right to attend and report about all trial proceedings
as those representing the televising network. 9
As long as access to the courtroom is unaffected, the broadcast-fees-for-
crime-victims proposal is constitutional. Neither the Supreme Courte ° nor
that a state statute requiring the exclusion of the public and the press from courtrooms during the
testimony of all minor victims in sex offense trials violated the First Amendment); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980) (finding that a state trial court's
order closing a murder trial to the public and press violated the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments).
247. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 392-93 (1979) (holding that a state court
order barring members of the press and public from a pretrial suppression hearing was
constitutional). For more complete discussions of cases outlining the public's right of access to
criminal trials, see MuRPHY, supra note 10, at app. 1 at 97-103; Lassiter, supra note 2, at 947-
59. Compare ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, at 19, setting forth Standard 8-3.1 which
"prohibits representatives of the news media from broadcasting or publishing any information in
their possession relating to a criminal case."
248. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 578.
249. See infra app. at 50.
250. Although some commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court should recognize
a constitutionalright to televise trials, see Frank, supra note 36; Riemer, supra note 39, at 1296-
1307, the Court has not recognized such a right. Instead, it has ruled only that allowing television
coverage does not necessarily deprive a criminal defendant of his right to a fair trial. Chandler
v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574-75 (1981) (rejecting a per se rule "that all photographic or
broadcast coverage of criminal trials is inherently a denial of due process"); see also Lassiter,
supra note 2, at 942 ("[I]n the combination of Estes and Chandler the Supreme Court struck with
Solomon-type wisdom, holding that the Constitution neither prohibited nor mandated televised
coverage of trial proceedings .... "); id. at 965-66 ("[Tlhere is no constitutional right to
introduce cameras in the courtroom."); Gardner, supra note 19, at 484-85 ("Ihe Supreme
Court's decisions in the cameras in the courtroom area establish [that] .... broadcasters do not
possess a first ... or sixth amendment right to televise criminal trials [and that] .... states may
permit cameras in their courtrooms only if they take steps to protect the defendant's ... rights
to a fair trial.") (footnote omitted).
One Supreme Court case that did not directly deal with the issue of televising trial
proceedings suggests that the Supreme Court is unlikely to establish a constitutional right to
televise trials. See Lassiter, supra note 2, at 955-56 ("Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,
[435 U.S. 589 (1978),] the Court's latest decision arguably involving this question, may be
interpreted as providing a fairly dispositive answer opposing a First Amendment right for
televised coverage of trials.").
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any other court " has ruled that a judge must allow cameras into the
courtroom. If courts can exclude cameras altogether, they can also make
payment of broadcast fees a condition of access 52
3. Broadcast Fees Cannot Create the Push for Revenue
Finally, some may argue that the collection of broadcast fees may turn
televised trials into unseemly efforts to generate revenue through entertainment
programming. 3 The reality, of course, is that trials are already televised in
an effort to generate revenue, but the television networks are the primary
recipients of this income in the current system 5 4 Unless and until courts
decide to bar cameras from courtrooms, a highly unlikely event,2" the
fervor to generate revenue through televised trials will continue.
Of course, courts must protect the integrity of the judicial process. The
251. Lower federal courts have consistently held that no First Amendment right to televise
trials exists. Gardner, supra note 19, at 480-81 & n.33. Cases rejecting media petitions for the
right to televise trials include Conway v. United States, 852 F.2d 187, 188 (6th Cir. 1988);
Edwards, 785 F.2d at 1296; and Westmoreland, 752 F.2d at 23. Even when the defendantwishes
to have the trial televised, no right to a televised trial exists. United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d
617, 622 (7th Cir. 1985).
252. Cf. Kerley, 753 F.2d at 620-21 (stating that "a limitation on the manner of news
coverage .... can withstand constitutional scrutiny so long as it is reasonable and neutral, as
with time, place, and manner restrictions generally").
In a similar vein, if courts can charge parties for the right to use the court system, see
supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text, they should be allowed to charge networks for the
right to televise trials, see supra text accompanying notes 223-24.
253. Many already object to the entertainment and business aspects of televised trials. See,
e.g., THALER, supra note 1, at 37 (noting that the judge in Big Dan's Tavern gang rape trial
charged that, "[tihe essential motive of the press ... was crass commercial exploitation");
Frank, supra note 36, at 793-94 ("Some opponents, including jurists, have stated that the courts
should not be the subject of commercial exploitation. Another concern is that televised trials may
be perceived as entertainment rather than news by a confused public.") (footnote omitted); Kollin,
supra note 12, at 37 ("But the business of courts should be justice, not t-shirts. And we, as
responsible citizens as well as journalists, should be concerned about creating an atmosphere
that puts t-shirts in the front seat and justice in the back."); see also Bosco, supra note 96, at 146
(noting that members of Parents of Murdered Children initiated a national movement called
"Murder Is Not Entertainment"); Reske, supra note 109, at 48d (explaining that Sixth Circuit
Chief Judge Gilbert S. Merritt's displeasure with the television coverage of the Simpson trial
stems from the fact that it "is providing a forum more for entertainmentpurposes than for getting
at [the] truth"); Smolowe, supra note 74, at 38 (statement of Don Hewitt, the executive producer
of 60 Minutes) ("'I don't like the idea that a murder trial has been turned into an entertainment
special . . . . There are certain moments in American life that have a certain dignity."'); Stein,
supra note 108, at 16 ("The dark side . . . is the fact that the [Simpson] case has become an
'entertainment bonanza, exposing all the worst elements of American popular culture."').
254. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
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fact that the broadcasting of trials is primarily an entertainment and business
function does not mean that the court system's administration of trials should
be for these purposes. The realities of televised trials should not affect
decisions about whether trials should be conducted in the first place, or the
manner in which they are conducted generally. However, the reality
that broadcasting trials is an entertainment and business phenomenon should
affect the decisions and rules about broadcasting of trials.
The fundamental question is whether television networks are entitled to
all of the revenues generated through televised trials or whether they should
share some of these revenues with crime victims. In deciding between allowing
television networks to keep all revenue generated from televised trials and
asking them to share a portion of that revenue with uncompensated or
undercompensated crime victims, crime victims have the compelling
claim.25
6
V. CONCLUSION
The criminal justice system's widely disparate economic treatment of
crime victims and television networks cannot be justified. While crime victims
suffer significant economic losses from their victimization and from their
participation in the criminal justice system, television networks are given the
right to use that same system to generate substantial revenue without even
paying for this opportunity.
If television networks are going to use the criminal justice system as a
profit center, they should pay what the market will support for that privilege.
The fees generated from the sale of broadcast rights will help to compensate
victims for the losses they sustain by involuntarily entering the same system
that television networks are so anxious to exploit. Because trial broadcasting
is a growth industry, now is the time to implement this program. After all, the
next "Trial of the Century" may be just around the comer.
256. Because some funds would be forwarded to state victim compensation programs, see
infra app. at 52, to some extent the decision is also a choice between television networks and a
state's taxpayers. To the extent that funds for victim compensation programs come from general
tax revenue, see Greer, supra note 185, at 390, a state may be able to reduce the contribution
of taxpayers to the victims compensation program when broadcast fees are collected.
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APPENDIX
MODEL STATUTE OF BROADCAST FEES FOR CRIMINAL TRIALS
A. Introduction: Media agencies who desire to broadcast trials will,
in some cases, be allowed to do so. Except in the circumstances
outlined in subsection F, media agencies will pay a broadcast fee
for this privilege.
B. Definitions: For purposes of this rule:
1. "Electronic media coverage" means any photographing,
recording, or broadcasting of court proceedings by any
media agency using television, radio, photographic, or
recording equipment;
2. "Media agency" means any person or organization engag-
ing in entertainment production or news gathering or
reporting and includes any radio or television station or
network, newspaper, news service, magazine, trade paper,
in-house publication, professional journal, or other enter-
tainment-producing, news-reporting, or news-gathering
agency;
3. "Nonprofit media agency" means any media agency
that generates to revenue from its programming;
4. "Court" means the courtroom at issue, the courthouse, and
its entrances and exits; and
5. "Judge" means the judicial officer or officers assigned to
or presiding at the proceeding.
C. Media Coverage: Electronic media coverage is permitted only
pursuant to a written order by the judge. This provision does not
otherwise limit or restrict the right of the media to attend and
report about court proceedings.
1. A media agency may file a written request for an order
permitting electronic media coverage with the clerk of
court. In considering this request, the judge must give the
media agency, the parties, the victims of the crime, and
witnesses the opportunity to present their views in writing
or in a hearing following notice. The judge must consider
the views that are presented.
2. Except when an order is issued under subsection F, if the
judge issues a written order allowing electronic media
coverage, a media agency's right to participate in such
[Vol. 49:1
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coverage is contingent upon its prior payment of the
designated broadcast fee to the clerk of court. The clerk of
court will not allow individuals possessing electronic media
equipment access to the court prior to the payment of the
broadcast fee.
3. In the written order, the judge shall state whether the
broadcast fee will be the standard fee or a fee determined
through a sealed bid auction.
D. Broadcast Fee: The broadcast fee shall be either:
1. The standard fee per courtroom day (or any portion
thereof), which shall grant each media agency that pays the
fee the right to conduct nonexclusive electronic media
coverage for the number of prepaid courtroom days, but
not the right to resell or otherwise distribute any images
produced during electronic media coverage (and any other
media agency shall have the right to use any images broad-
cast or acquired by the media agency); or
2. The fee determined through a sealed bid auction, which
shall grant one designated media agency that pays the daily
fee determined through a sealed bid auction the right to
conduct exclusive electronic media coverage of the number
of prepaid courtroom days (or portions thereof), including
the right to resell any images produced during its electronic
media coverage.
E. Sealed Bid Auctions: Whenever a judge either sua sponte or from
the input of a media agency, party, victim, or witness, recognizes
that a case could generate broadcast fees in excess of those
that will be generated with the standard fee, the judge will
consider whether to conduct a sealed bid auction for the right to
conduct exclusive electronic media coverage. Neither a prior
order allowing nonexclusive electronic media coverage under the
standard fee nor the payment of any such fees by any media
agency will prevent the judge from considering whether to
conduct a sealed bid auction. If the judge conducts a sealed bid
auction, copies of the judge's order announcing the sealed bid
auction shall be served by the clerk of court upon every media
agency that has previously paid any broadcast fee or filed a
written request for an order permitting electronic media coverage
with the clerk of court. The judge may direct the clerk of court
to also serve other media agencies with copies of the order. The
order announcing the sealed bid auction shall include a statement
of the minimum acceptable bid and designation of the date and
1997]
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time by which sealed bids must be filed with the clerk of court.
The amount of the minimum acceptable bid and the amounts bid
by media agencies shall be stated in a fee for each court day (or
any portion thereof). Following the deadline for sealed bids, the
judge shall unseal the bids in open court and determine, based
solely upon the amounts bid, which media agency has secured the
right to conduct exclusive electronic media coverage of all future
proceedings.
F. Waiver of Broadcast Fees for Nonprofit Media Agencies: In the
event that no media agency other than a nonprofit media agency
has paid any broadcast fee or filed a written request for an order
permitting electronic media coverage with the clerk of court, the
judge may consider a written request from a nonprofit media
agency to conduct electronic media coverage without paying a
broadcast fee. In considering this request, the judge must give the
nonprofit media agency, other media agencies, the parties, the
victims of the crime, and witnesses the opportunity to present
their views, in writing or in a hearing following notice. The
nonprofit media agency must present sufficient evidence to allow
the judge to determine that it is indeed a nonprofit media agency.
If the request is granted, the nonprofit media agency will be
granted the right to conduct electronic media coverage, but not
the right to resell or otherwise distribute for profit any images
produced during electronic media coverage; and any other media
agency shall not have the right to use any images broadcast or
acquired by the nonprofit media agency.
G. Deposit and Distribution of Broadcast Fees: The clerk of court
shall deposit all broadcast fees in an account maintained only for
this purpose. Following the completion of all appeals or the
expiration of the time for the filing of a notice of appeal, the
clerk of court shall pay victims designated to receive restitution
the greater of the full amount of restitution ordered or the total
broadcast fees collected. If the total broadcast fees collected
exceed the amount of restitution ordered, the clerk of court shall
pay the excess to the victim compensation program for the benefit
of other crime victims. To the extent that the broadcast fees
provide payment to victims for restitution, the defendant will be
obligated to make restitution payments to the victim compensation
program. If the broadcast fees are not sufficient to pay the full
restitution ordered, the defendant's restitution payments will first
go toward payment of the balance of restitution owed to the
victims, then to the victim compensation program. If restitution
[Vol. 49: l
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is not awarded or if an award of restitution is reversed on appeal,
the clerk of court will pay the collected broadcast fees to the
victim compensation program.
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